Digital Commons at St. Mary's University
Faculty Articles

School of Law Faculty Scholarship

2013

Oil, Gas, and Mineral Titles: Resolving Perennial Problems in the
Shale Era
Laura H. Burney
St. Mary's University School of Law, lburney@stmarytx.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/facarticles
Part of the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Laura H. Burney, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Titles: Resolving Perennial Problems in the Shale Era, 62 U. Kan. L.
Rev. 97 (2013).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact
sfowler@stmarytx.edu, jcrane3@stmarytx.edu.

Oil, Gas, and Mineral Titles: Resolving Perennial
Problems in the Shale Era
Laura H. Burney*
"Long before the full frenzy of the boom, you could see its harbingers at the Mountrail
County courthouse ... and now it was the hour of the 'landmen,' the men and women
whose job was to dig through courthouse books for the often-tangled history of mineral
title and surface rights."
-North Dakota Went Boom, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 3, 2013.

1.

INTRODUCTION

The "shale revolution" dominates the news today.'

Analysts rank

* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University. Profess Burney has written extensively on oil and gas
law issues, and is a frequent speaker at energy resources conferences and courses for attorneys and
other professionals in the industry. She has served as a mediator and arbitrator in oil and gas and
other disputes, and has worked as an advocate or expert in oil and gas cases in several states.
1. See Talia Buford, Is Exporting Natural Gas a Problem?, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2013, 4:18
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/abundance-of-natural-gas-more-harm-than-goodAM),

1. See Talia Buford, Is Exporting Natural Gas a Problem?, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2013, 4:18
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/abundance-of-natural-gas-more-harm-than-goodAM),
87533.html ("The U.S. is in the midst of a shale revolution, with fracking making accessible deposits
of gas trapped deep in shale rock that a decade ago were unreachable."); Jennifer Hiller, A 21stCentury Oil Boom in the Lone Star State, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEWS (Feb. 25, 2013, 6:46 PM),
http://www.mysanantonio.com/business/article/A-2 1st-century-oil-boom-in-the-Lone-Star-State4303192.php (claiming shale production will propel oil production in the United States past some
other OPEC countries); Jennifer Hiller, Study: Shale Gas Boom Will Last Decades, SAN ANTONIO
ExPRESS-NEWS (Mar. 1, 2013, 12:57 AM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/business/article/StudyShale-gas-boom-will-last-decades-4318224.php (mentioning the shale plays in Texas, Louisiana and
Arkansas); Fracking: 365 Lee County Landowners Don't Possess Drill Rights, THE FAYETTEVILLE
OBSERVER (Feb. 18, 2013, 5:26 AM), http://fayobserver.com/articles/2013/02/18/1238011 (stating
that landowners will not profit "if a statewide moratorium on hydraulic fracturing is lifted"); Vicki
Vaughan, Texas is On its Way to Being 'Saudi Texas', SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Feb. 17,
2013, 8:38 AM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/default/article/Texas-is-on-its-way-to-being-SaudiTexas-4284822.php (noting the vast increase in oil production thanks to shale play) [hereinafter
Vaughan, Saudi Texas]. In addition to dominating the news, shale play stories can be found on
YouTube and in a theater near you. See GASLAND (2010), http://www.gaslandthemovie.com
(providing facts about and behind the documentary); see also PROMISED LAND (2012), available at
http://focusfeatures.com/promised land (last visited Aug. 22, 2013) (detailing the storyline of
PROMISED LAND, a movie about the impact of establishing new natural gas drilling sites in a small
farming
community);
PROMISED
LAND
TRAILER,
YOUTUBE
(Sept.
21,
2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-AHQtlNAkhlo (providing a quick preview). However, not all of
the news about the shale play is positive. See Anne C. Mulkern, California: Massive Shale Play
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current shale play booms as bigger than the historic East Texas and
Spindletop oil discoveries. 2 Texas boasts record-setting production from
the Barnett, Haynesville, and Eagle Ford Shale plays. Prosperity has
returned to Pennsylvania, site of the first oil well drilled in 1859, and
continues through the vast Marcellus Shale, which extends through
several states.4 Other states, including Colorado, Montana, and North
Dakota, share in the shale play success.5 The technologies responsible
for the surge in production from these "tight rock" shale formations,
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal wells, have revived production from
Predictedto Trigger New 'Gold Rush', ENv'T & ENERGY PUBL'G, LLC. (Dec. 5, 2012, 3:08 PM),
http://www.eenews.net/public/energywire/2012/12/05/1
(noting that there are environmental
concerns associated with fracking in California).
2. Oil output in Texas has doubled since Eagle Ford production began and in November,
2012, reached 2.139 million barrels a day. See Vaughan, Saudi Texas, supra note 1. From January
10 until January 19, 1901, Spindletop's Lucas Geyser produced 100,000 barrels of oil per day.
Robert Wooster and Christine Moor Sanders, Spindletop Oilfield, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE
(Oct. 6, 2013, 4:25 PM), http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/dos03. See also Vickie
Vaughan, Eagle FordImpact Peggedat $25 Billion in 2011, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (May 9,
2012, 11:38 PM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/localnews/article/Eagle-Ford-impactpegged-at-25-billion-in-2011-3546504.php (touting the Eagle Ford shale "as a modern-day
Spindletop"); see also Chad Watt, Eagle FordAll Grown Up, FORBES (Oct. 16, 2012, 3:12 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mergermarket/2012/10/16/eagle-ford-all-grown-up-2/
(grouping the
Eagle Ford Shale with the Permian Basin and Bakken field as the top producers in the United
States). Recent shale play has also rekindled hopes about Spindletop and untapped reservoirs
previously unattainable. Emily Pickrell, Oilmen Hope to Re-tap Fabled Wealth of Spindletop
Gusher,
SAN
ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS
(Feb.
7,
2013,
8:32
PM),
http://www.mysanantonio.com/business/article/Oilmen-hope-to-re-tap-fabled-wealth-of-Spindletop4261411 .php. For a brief history of the East Texas Play and Spindletop see DANIEL YERGIN, THE
PRIZE: THE Epic QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER 26 (1991).
3. See Vaughan, Saudi Texas, supranote 1 (declaring Texas's oil production has reached "alltime record highs"); see also Texas Oil Production Setting Record Numbers, CROSSROADS TODAY
(July 12, 2013 7:05PM), http://www.crossroadstoday.com/content/news/story/Texas-Oil-ProductionSetting-Record-Numbers/3UlGKAHIiOSjYTxDsL9P6Q.cspx ("A new report said Texas is now
pumping more oil that some countries and a lot of it is thanks [to] the Eagle Ford Shale.").
4. "The Marcellus Shale is truly enormous, a natural wonder extending from New York to
Tennessee along a swath of territory larger than Greece." Thomas E. Kurth et al., American Law
andJurisprudenceon Fracking, 58 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 4-1, at § 4.06 (2012). The Marcellus
shale spans across parts of Maryland, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. See Hobart
King,
Marcellus Shale-Appalachian Basin Natural Gas Play, GEOLOGY.COM,
http://geology.com/articles/marcellus-shale.shtml (mapping the Marcellus shale across various states
and its varying depths).
5. Louise S. Durham, Shale List Grows, AAPG EXPLORER (July 2012),
http://www.aapg.org/explorer/2012/07jul/shale _ist07l2.cfm. Others are considering whether to join
the fracking revolution. See Aaron Sankin, California Fracking Lawsuit: Judge Slams Obama
Administration,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Apr.
9,
2013,
6:23
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/09/california-fracking-lawsuit_n_3046838.html (addressing
potential environmental concerns presented by fracking); see also NEW YORKERS AGAINST
FRACKING, http://nyagainstfracking.org/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (campaigning against fracking in
New York and showcasing the various reasons against lifing the moratorium on fracking).
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others, such as the Mississippian Lime formation in Kansas.6 In fact,
courthouses across the country have been "packed with landmen looking
for additional resources."
Along with prosperity, however, drilling booms spawn litigation
booms as people seek a piece of the profits from the oil and gas pie. 8
One source for disputes is the "often-tangled history" of mineral titles.9
Landmen and other title examiners encounter convoluted transfers
through deeds and other documents, and must decipher the language
parties choose and courts' interpretations of those words.
As I have written, mineral deeds present a list of perennial
interpretative problems,10 which create uncertainty about ownership
6. John Kemp, DreamingofBakken, Kansas Welcomes Oil Drillers, REUTERS (Jan. 8, 2013,
11:06
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/08/column-kemp-kansas-frackingidUSL5E9C89J220130108.
7. Jennifer Hiller, Shale Playground in W. Texas, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Jan. 10,
2013, 11:50 AM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/business/article/Shale-playground-in-W-Texas4180979.php.
8. See Laura H. Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds: The Legacy of the OneEighth Royalty and Other Stories, 33 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 2 (2001) (noting nineteenth century oil
boom that presented title perfection issues) [hereinafter Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty
Deeds]; see also Review ofEmerging Resources: U.S. Shale Gas and Shale Oil Plays, U.S. ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.
5-6
(July
2011),
available
at
http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/usshalegas/pdf/usshaleplays.pdf (noting that all across the
United States shale success is popping up); Daniel Gilbert & Kris Maher, Shale Gas Fuels Legal
Boom: Fights Over Underground Rights Confound Companies, Pennsylvania Landowners, WALL
STREET

JOURNAL

(Oct.

31,

2011),

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1 0001424052970204505304577003960524923098.html
("The
natural-gas boom in Pennsylvania is stoking legal battles over who owns gas that was worthless until
a few years ago but now holds the promise of great wealth.").
9. Chip Brown, North Dakota Went Boom, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Jan. 31, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/magazine/north-dakota-wentboom.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0. Landmen and other title examiners must "untangle" and trace
title through deeds, wills and other proceedings affecting transfers of property to locate current
owners. See Zain Shauk, Keystone XL Work Veers onto Wrong Land, FUEL Fix, (Jan. 28, 2013, 1:46
PM), http://fuelfix.com/blog/2013/01/28/keystone-xl-plans-take-work-onto-wrong-land/ (describing
effect of mistakes in determining ownership for Keystone XL pipeline). That process raises a host
of title issues not addressed in this article. See, e.g., Capps v. Weflen, 826 N.W.2d 605, 609 (N.D.
2013) (noting that a myriad documents and statutes affect mineral titles, such as dormant mineral
acts in some states).
10. See generally Laura H. Burney, Oil, Gas & Mineral Conveyances: The Perennial Problems
(And How to Avoid Them), Paper Delivered at the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Oil &
Gas Law Short Course (Oct. 25, 2012) (paper on file with the Kansas Law Review) (examining
interpretive problems presented by mineral deeds and describing the courts' methods of dealing with
them) [hereinafter Burney, Oil, Gas & Mineral Conveyances]. Mineral titles create problems not
encountered in typical real property transactions, such as the sale of a home, where "title companies"
search records and provide detailed information about title issues; in the oil patch the duty to
interpret mineral titles falls to landmen and oil and gas attorneys who write title opinions. See
generally Terry E. Hogwood, The Myth of the Cured Title Opinion, 49 ROCKY MTN MIN. L. FOUND.
J. 345 (2012) (describing steps taken by landmen and title attorneys to cure oil and gas titles).
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rights in mineral estates and the proceeds from the sale of oil and gas
production." Although the list is long, in this article I address the
following: (1) deeds with conflicting fractions; (2) the "mineral or
royalty" question; (3) the application of the common law "rule against
perpetuities" to non-participating royalties, a common interest in the oil
patch; (4) the meaning of "minerals"-does it include oil and gas?;
(5) the executive's duty to lease; and (6) deed interpretation versus
"reformation."
Recent cases have clarified some issues and complicated others.
Regarding conflicting fractions, addressed in Part II, Texas cases have
rejected the controversial "two-grant" doctrine they created in favor of a
four-corners approach.
As part of this approach, opinions have
acknowledged but not embraced the "estate misconception." The estate
misconception reflects the legacy of the traditional 1/8 landowner's lease
royalty and its effect on drafting and interpreting mineral and royalty

deeds. 12
Determining whether a deed created a mineral or a royalty interest,
discussed in Part III, has presented a frequent challenge for title
examiners and courts. A goal courts should embrace for resolving this
and other perennial issues is title stability.13 Obtaining this goal requires
interpretative approaches that increase transferability by decreasing
claims on property rights. 14 Approaches that focus on extrinsic evidence
produce case-by-case results and detract from title stability. Instead, to
11. Bumey, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 2 (noting mineral deed
interpretation problems).
12. Infra Part II.A.2.b; see also Laura H. Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant
Doctrine in Texas Deed Construction, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 73, 87-89 (1993) (outlining the "estate
misconception" and its effect on drafting deeds) [hereinafter Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth].
13. See, e.g., Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984) (ruling prospectively
only to avoid title confusion based upon previous decisions); accord Rucker v. DeLay, 289 P.3d
1166, 1173 (Kan. 2012) (overruling the application of the rule against perpetuities in regards to
interests reserved in the grantor to promote title stability). See also Spurlock v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R.
Co., 694 P.2d 299, 308 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (finding the term "minerals" to be unambiguous and
expansive for policy reasons); Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 40 (1882) (looking to the
common meaning of "minerals" to determine whether oil and gas was included in a reservation); I
EUGENE KUNTZ ET AL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS

§ 13.3,

at 375-85 (1962)

(promoting the idea that when there is a general severance of mineral estate, the entire estate should
be severed to promote stability); JOHN S. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS OIL AND GAS LAW

496 (6th ed. 2012) (preferring an expansive definition of "other minerals" because it avoids case-bycase searches for the parties' intent, which contributes to title stability).
14. Laura H. Burney, A PragmaticApproach to Decision Making in the Next Era of Oil and
Gas Jurisprudence, 16 J. ENERGY NAT. RES. & ENvT'L. L. 1, 12 n.36 (1996) (noting that Judge

Richard Posner and other scholars "have emphasized the effect of clarifying titles to land on
efficiency") [hereinafter Bumey, A PragmaticApproach].
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promote this prized policy in the oil patch, courts should strive to view
deeds as unambiguous and focus on language in the document.15
Consistent with that approach, in resolving the "mineral or royalty"
question, the "royalty" label often guides and ends courts' inquiries.
Other decisions, however, accord a chameleon-like quality to the term,
allowing its meaning to change if a lease pre-dated the deed.16 Because
this fact-based approach promotes the estate misconception and creates
title uncertainty, it should be abandoned.' 7 Yet courts addressing this
and other issues must debate the "precedent problem": whether decadesold decisions, even if misguided, should apply to shale era disputes in the
name of preserving title stability.
A 2012 Kansas Supreme Court decision faced the problem of
misguided precedent in Rucker v. DeLay,19 discussed in Part III.B.2. In
that case, the court departed from its earlier position that nonparticipating royalty interests violate the rule against perpetuities. Yet
despite recognizing that most jurisdictions view non-participating royalty
interests-a common interest burdening mineral estates-as vested and
therefore exempt from rule against perpetuities' application, the court
unnecessarily limited its ruling to reserved interests.
Pennsylvania recently faced the precedent problem regarding the
meaning of "minerals." As explained in Part IV, most jurisdictions view
that term as including oil and gas. In Pennsylvania, however, an 1882
case created the "Dunham rule," which determined that oil and gas are
not included in that term. 20 In a recent case, Butler v. Charles Powers
Estate,21 claimants under an 1881 deed urged the court to reconsider that
rule when interpreting deeds affecting modem Marcellus production.

15. Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 12, at 78-79 (describing steps in deed
interpretation process).
16. See Melton v. Sneed, 109 P.2d 509, 512-13 (Okla. 1940) (finding that the term "royalty"
meant "mineral" when grant did not reference a lease); see also Hamilton v. Woll, 823 N.W.2d 754,
757 (N.D. 2012) (noting influence of Oklahoma decisions regarding the use of the term "royalty"
when there is a lease on the property).
17. See infra Part III.B for the influence of other factors besides the estate misconception in a
non-ownership view of mineral estates, such as Oklahoma.
18. One solution to the precedent problem is for courts to overrule misguided precedent and
apply new rules prospectively only. See Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 102-03 (overruling "surface
destruction" test for interpretation of phrase "other minerals" from the date of decision onward). But
see Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 352 S.W.3d 479, 491 (Tex. 2011) (declining to limit ruling
regarding scope of executive's duty to prospective effect).
19. 289 P.3d 1166 (Kan. 2012).
20. Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36 (1882).
21. 29 A.3d 35 (Pa. 2011).
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Addressing the need for title stability, writers warned that, "until the
issue is resolved, development of the Marcellus shale in Pennsylvania
may come to a near halt as a result of the concern of oil and gas
companies that they have obtained leases from the wrong person." 2 2
Cognizant of these concerns, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
recognized the significance of public reliance on Dunham and reaffirmed
it as the rule in that state.23 However, in this part, I explain that the
Butler opinion should have expressly categorized the Dunham rule as a
rule of property, distinct from a rule of construction, to better promote
the goal of title stability. 24
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court assessed public reliance on
its prior rulings, a recent Texas Supreme Court opinion fails to address
that concern. Part V examines that recent case, Lesley v. Veteran's Land
Board,25 which addressed the duty owed by an executive-the owner of
the right to lease-to non-executive mineral owners. In that case the
court held that the executive's duty may arise prior to the execution of a
lease, contradicting other cases, including one of its own, which had held
the duty arises only after a lease has been executed.2 6
Lesley also involved deed reformation versus interpretation, another
issue affecting mineral titles, examined in Part VI.27 The difference is
significant: when courts engage in deed interpretation, statutes of
limitations do not apply because they are interpreting, not reforming, the
language.28 However, when parties seek reformation claiming the words
in the deed do not reflect their intent, their cause of action could be
barred by limitations.2 9 In Lesley, the court allowed the discovery rule to
extend the applicable statute, meaning reformation causes of action could
remain viable for years after a deed was delivered, an approach that
destabilizes land titles. 30 Analyzing the Lesley issues and other perennial
22. LOWE, supra note 13, at 509.
23. Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, 65 A.3d 885, 897 (Pa. 2013) (noting that Dunham has
been the "unaltered, unwavering rule of property law" governing real estate transactions in
Pennsylvania since 1882).
24. See infra Part IV.
25. 352 S.W.3d 479 (Tex. 2011).
26. Id. at 491 (contradicting In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2003)).
27. See infra Part VI.B.1-2.
28. See Lesley 352 S.W.3d at 485-86 (stating that while "a suit for reformation of a deed is
governed by the four year statute of limitations," the court disagreed with the trial court's holding
that the statute of limitations barred the claim to one-fourth of the mineral estate because there was a
factual issue at the heart of the dispute).
29. Id. (citing Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939, 943-44 (Tex. 1980)).
30. Id at 485-68 (finding that the statutes of limitations did not bar the plaintiffs claim).

2013]

OIL, GAS, AND MINERAL TITLES

103

problems discussed below provides guidance for title examiners,
drafters,3 1 and courts as parties seek their share-real or imagined-of
profits from oil and gas production in the shale era.32
II. "CONFLICTING FRACTIONS"

A. Background
Property owners face two key decisions when creating, by grant or
reservation, interests in their subsurface estates: first, whether to create a
mineral interest or a royalty interest; and second, what the fractional size
of that interest should be.33 This section examines courts' interpretations
of the second decision and the lessons those decisions teach regarding
drafting in the shale era.
1. Why Conflicting Fractions Were Used and Why They Are Not
Necessary
Assume Owner has decided to convey to Grantee an undivided 1/2
fractional mineral interest, rather than a royalty interest. Assume also
31. Throughout this article I use the term "drafter" and focus primarily on interests created in
deeds by grant or reservation. However, the interpretative approaches and drafting advice I discuss
applies to other documents, such as wills and trusts.
32. Writers often point to the year 2004 as the beginning of the modem shale era, when gas
prices first boosted production from the Barnett and other shales. See Shale Gas: Applying
Technology to Solve America's Energy Challenges 3, NAT'L ENERGY TECH. LAB., DEP'T OF
ENERGY
(Mar.
2011),
http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oilgas/publications/brochures/ShaleGasMarch_201 1.pdf (recounting the timeline for shale plays);
see also John D. Furlow & John R. Hays, Jr., Disclosurewith Protection of Trade Secrets Comes to
the Hydraulic FracturingRevolution, 7 TEx. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 289, 298 (2012) ("Since
1997, the growth in U.S. natural gas production and reserves from the shale plays has been
exponential. In 2000, shale gas production had started to pick up, but at 0.39 trillion cubic feet (Tcf)
it still represented only 2% of the 19.18 Tcf of natural gas produced domestically that year. In 2010,
shale gas production had grown to 5.00 TcF or 23% of total U.S. natural gas production.").
Booms understandably cause grantors to regret previous grants, such as the failure to reserve
minerals in land that is now subject to the shale booms. See, e.g., Kowcheck v. Pittsburgh Terminal
Realization Corp., No. 2009-4328, 2011 WL 9753960, at *4-5 (Pa. Com. Pl. Civil Div. Nov. 14,
2011) (arguing that parties saying "oil and gas" does not mean Marcellus gas). "Plaintiffs' counsel
writes 'the Marcellus Shale ... was not what was intended to be transferred by fee simple back when
the transfer was originally made in this matter."' Id. at 4. The booms ensure that courts will see a
surge in deed cases involving regret and wishful thinking as well as the perennial issues I address
below.
33. See White v. Smyth, 214 S.W.2d 967, 976 (Tex. 1948) (determining that the mineral estate
was not partitionable in kind). Therefore, owners tend to grant or reserve undivided interests in their
subsurface estates. These undivided interests can be expressed with fractions or percentages. As
demonstrated above, conflicting fractions have spawned the most litigation.
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that Owner has previously leased his land to Oil Company with a
familiar lease form, which is commonly viewed as creating a fee simple
determinable estate in the lessee. That lease is an older version requiring
the lessee to pay the owner-lessor the traditional, but no longer common,
1/8 landowner's royalty.34 This form lease conveys a fee simple
determinable estate in all, or 8/8, of the mineral estate to Oil Company,
leaving Owner with a non-possessory future interest, called a possibility
of reverter, in all, or 8/8, of the mineral estate. Note that only in the oil
patch will one find "the whole" defined as 8/8. As described below, this
phenomenon and others stem from the legacy of the 1/8 royalty in older
form leases.36
Today it is clear that Owner's pre-existing lease has not converted
Owner's interest in the mineral estate from an interest in all (8/8) to only
1/8.3' The lease's royalty clause entitles Owner to a share of the
proceeds from the sale of the production, but does not reduce the size of
his possibility of reverter.38 Owner owns a non-possessory interest in all
of the minerals, but he can convey a fractional interest subject to the preexisting lease. To convey the desired undivided 1/2 mineral interest, the
owner should use "mineral" language and insert the fraction 1/2 in the
form's designated space for the fractional interest Owner intends to
convey.

34. See Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 28 (acknowledging
that leases traditionally convey a 1/8 royalty but notes that in Brown v. Havard, the language
conveyed a lesser royalty).
35. Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 460 (Tex. 1998); 1
ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS §3.09(E), at 3-78
(2009) (noting that possibility of reverter is vested interest lessor retains after granting a lease); see
PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS
TERMS 818 (Aileen M. Sterling et al. eds., 11th ed. 2000) (describing a possibility of reverter as the
"interest left in a grantor or lessor after a grant of land or minerals subject to a special limitation").
36. See infra Part II.A.2.b.
37. Laura H. Burney, The Interaction of the Division Order and the Lease Royalty Clause, 28
ST. MARY'S L.J. 353, 429 (1997) ("[I]t should be considered well-settled in Texas that the oil and
gas lease vests 8/8ths of the oil and gas in the lessee, not 7/8ths, with the lessor retaining a
possibility of reverter in 8/8ths.").
38. Id. (noting that lessor retains a possibility of reverter in all 8/8).
39. For examples of deed forms for accomplishing these goals, see, e.g., 4 ALOYSIUS A.
LEOPOLD, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: LAND TITLES AND TITLE EXAMINATION § 23.70 (3d ed. 2012);
6 WILLIAM B. BURFORD, WEST'S TEXAS FORMS: MINERALS, OIL & GAS § 1:3 (4th ed. 2012).
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2. Why Multiclause Deed Forms Were Used and Why They Are Not
Necessary
Another fact is clear today: as a matter of law, Grantee's 1/2
undivided ownership in Owner's mineral estate entitles her to a
proportionate share of the rents and royalties payable under the terms of
the pre-existing lease. 4 0 Therefore, after the conveyance, Oil Company
owes 1/2 of the 1/8 landowner's lease royalty to Owner and the other 1/2
to Grantee. 4 1 That fact, however, eluded early courts.
a.

Development of the "Multiclause" Deed Form

For example, in Caruthers v. Leonard, the court held that a
conveyance subject to an existing lease did not entitle the grantee to a
proportionate share of the rents and royalties payable under that existing
lease. 4 2 In response to that decision, which was later overruled, 43 a
notorious deed form with multiple clauses and spaces for fractions
developed to insure that Grantee received rents and royalties in
proportion to the fractional mineral interest conveyed."4 Specifically, in
addition to the granting clause, this deed form recited that the
conveyance is made "subject to" the existing lease and "covers and
includes" the specified fractional interest of rents and royalties in the
existing lease. 45 Another clause provided that the grantee would receive
the stated fractional interest in rents and royalties payable under future
leases.46 Notably, these additional subject to and future lease clauses

40. See, e.g., Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 464 (finding that grantor's possibility of reverter
of 1/12 of the mineral interests included a right to royalties under the lease terms); see also Bumey,
InterpretingMineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 14-15 (noting that "the deed effectively
conveyed all attributes" of the mineral lease, including the right to share royalties).
41. The proportionate reduction clause in typical lease forms allows the lessee to reduce these
payments proportionately to Owner and Grantee if they have leased 100 percent. See MARTIN &
KRAMER, supra note 35, at 871-72 (defining "proportionate reduction clause" and noting that the
purpose of such a clause is to reduce the payments to a lessor to be in proportion to the lessor's
interest).
42. 254 S.W. 779 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923), abrogatedby Hager v. Stakes, 294 S.W. 835
(Tex. 1927); see Burney, The RegrettableRebirth, supranote 12, 86-87 (discussing the legacy of the
Caruthersdecision).
43. See generally Hager, 294 S.W. 835; Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 306 (1943) (noting
Hager's overruling of Caruthers).
44. See generally Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 12, at 86-90 (outlining the
development of the multiclause deed form).
45. Id. at 86.
46. Id
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lacked granting clause language.4 7 The reason for this omission is
simple: these clauses were inserted not to make additional grants, but to
clarify that the grantee receives a proportionate amount of rents and
royalties under any lease, existing or future.48
Courts eventually corrected the errors of Caruthers.4 9 But the form,
which should be avoided, exists in formbooks today.so If filled out
properly, with the same fraction in every clause, it presents no problems
for title examiners or courts. Unfortunately, misconceptions among
laypersons and legal minds have complicated drafting and interpreting
these deeds. The primary offender is the "estate misconception."51
b. Role of the "Estate Misconception"
The estate misconception-a legacy of the "usual 1/8m landowner's
royalty"-describes the confusion regarding estate ownership after
leasing property.52 In the example above, Owner, under the influence of
the estate misconception, assumed the lease converted his ownership to
1/8 in the mineral estate. Therefore, if Owner intended to convey an
undivided 1/2 interest, he multiplied that fraction by 1/8 and inserted the
fraction 1/16 in the deed's granting clause. Because of the wording of
the other post-Caruthers clauses-the subject to and future lease
clauses-Owner inserted the fraction 1/2 in those spaces, creating a deed
with conflicting fractions.54

47.

Id.

48. Id. (noting that this form of deed was in response to correct the holding in Caruthers,
which found "that when a grantee received an interest in a mineral estate that was already under
lease, only a reversionary interest passed").
49. Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 306 (1943) (noting that the court in Hager overruled
Caruthers).
50. See, e.g., 6 WILIAM B. BURFORD, WEST'S TEXAS FORMS: MINERALS, OIL & Gas

§ 1:2

(4th ed. 2012) (outlining the various clauses included in a mineral deed form and cautioning against
"coupling with a grant of the minerals the words 'royalty,' 'royalty interest,' or minerals 'produced
and saved' from the land" to avoid conveying a royalty interest).
51. See Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 460 (Tex.
1998) (defining "estate misconception" and describing its effect on drafting); Burney, The
RegrettableRebirth, supranote 12, at 87-89 (reviewing the estate misconception).
52.

See Bumey, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 15 (explaining that

lessors sometimes believe that they only own 1/8 interests in the minerals after the lease when in
actuality they have a possibility of reverter in 8/8).
53. See supraPart HAL.
54. See Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 12, at 86-87 (emphasizing the effect of
the Caruthers decision on deed forms and noting that grantors wishing to convey a 1/2 mineral
interest "can do so by simply conveying a 1/2 mineral interest, regardless of an existing lease").
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B. InterpretingMulticlause Deeds with ConflictingFractions:The Birth
and Demise of the "Two-Grant" Doctrine

These multiple fractions created uncertainty for title examiners.
Which fraction represented the size of the interest Owner intended to
convey? Or did the deed make multiple grants? Early cases provided an
answer: deeds with multiple and conflicting fractions conveyed more
than one interest." Writers labeled this interpretative approach the "twogrant" doctrine. In this section, I review the development and demise
of the two-grant approach to interpreting deeds with conflicting fractions.
The next section updates a related issue: deed forms with double or
restated fractions.
1. ConcordOil Company v. Pennzoil Exploration & Production
Company

The two-grant doctrine arose in Texas, where the multiclause deed
form originated. Texas courts adopted this interpretative approach for
multiclause deed forms with conflicting fractions beginning in the
1940s.5' The last supreme court case to address the two-grant doctrine is
a 1998 opinion, Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Production
Co. 58

In Concord Oil, courts were confronted with this deed: a 1937
conveyance of a mineral interest with the fraction 1/96 in the granting
clause and the fraction 1/12 in a subsequent clause.59 At the time, the
grantor owned a 1/12 mineral interest in the property, which was
burdened by a pre-existing lease providing for a 1/8 landowner's
royalty.60 Notably, the deed through which the grantor had received his
55. Some cases viewed these deeds as granting one fraction at delivery of the deed that
expanded upon expiration of the existing lease. See, e.g., Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466,
467 (Tex. 1991) (noting that, upon termination of the lease, the grantee's interest "expanded into a
full one-half [mineral interest] by operation of law"); see also Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth,
supra note 12, at 92-94 (discussing the "expansion facet" and related decisions, including Jupiter
Oil).
56. See Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex.
1998) (discussing the trial court's reliance on the two-grant doctrine in its decision and defining the
doctrine); 2 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 327.2 (2012);
Tevis Herd, Deed Construction and the "Repugnant to the Grant" Doctrine, 21 TEX. TECH L. REV.
635, 651 (1990).
57. Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 12, at 90.
58. 966 S.W.2d 451
59. Id. at 453.
60. Id.
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1/12 mineral interest a year earlier was the same as the 1937 deed form
but the fraction 1/12 appeared in both clauses.
By the 1990s, Pennzoil owned the grantor's interest, if any, under the
1937 deed, and Concord Oil owned the grantee's interest.62 Just as
today's shale plays are spawning lawsuits over mineral deeds delivered
decades ago, renewed production on property covered by the 1937 deed
prompted Pennzoil to sue Concord Oil in 1993.
Pennzoil relied on precedent establishing the two-grant approach for
interpreting multiclause deeds with conflicting fractions. Under that
approach, Pennzoil argued that the 1937 deed had conveyed a 1/96
mineral interest and a 1/12 interest in rents and royalties under an
existing lease, which had terminated. Therefore, Pennzoil claimed that
Concord Oil, as successor to the grantee, owned only a 1/96 interest in
the mineral estate, meaning Pennzoil owned the grantor's remaining
interest. Concord Oil, on the other hand, argued that the 1937 deed had
conveyed the grantor's entire 1/12 interest and Pennzoil had received
nothing through its chain of title.
The trial court and court of appeals agreed with Pennzoil.6
Eventually, however, the Texas Supreme Court ruled in favor of Concord
Oil, holding that the conflicting fractions could be harmonized from the
four-corners of the document. In light of the particular language of the
1937 deed, the court held it conveyed a single 1/12 mineral interest.65
However, because the opinion was a plurality, with concurring and
dissenting opinions, the fate of the two-grant doctrine remained
unclear. 6 6 Concord Oil had urged the court to reject the two-grant
doctrine and embrace the estate misconception as the explanation for

61.

Id.

62. Id. at 453-54 (noting that Concord Oil Company's claim was brought through the grantee
of the 1937 deed and that the 1937 grantor conveyed another mineral deed in 1961 which was
subsequently conveyed to Pennzoil Exploration and Production Company).
63. Id at 454.
64. Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 878 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Tex. App.
1994) (rejecting Concord's reading of the deed to convey two separate estates), rev'd, 966 S.W.2d
451 (Tex. 1998).
65. Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 453.
66. The opinion breaks down to a 4-1-4 decision. Id at 454. The plurality found that the deed
conveyed a single 1/12 mineral interest and harmonized the conflicting fractions within the deed. Id
(plurality opinion). The concurring opinion by Justice Enoch agreed that only a single estate was
created but wrote separately to emphasize the overconveyance that would occur if the dissent's
interpretations were used. Id (Enoch, J., concurring). The dissent argued for the "two-grant"
doctrine to determine that two estates were created, "a 1/96 perpetual interest in the minerals, and a
1/12 interest in rentals and royalties . . . ." Id. at 465 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
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conflicting fractions in multiclause deed forms. As explained above, that
misconception, which emanates from the typical 1/8 landowner's royalty,
explains why the conflicting fractions follow a pattern: they are multiples
of 1/8. Typically, drafters multiplied the intended fraction by 1/8 and
inserted that number in the granting clause. Indeed, early case law
sanctioned that approach.67
The 1937 Concord Oil deed followed the pattern: 1/96 in the
granting clause = 1/8 times 1/12 (the fraction in the subsequent clause).68
As another example, the deed at issue in a 1991 Texas Supreme Court
case, Luckel v. White, contained the fractions 1/4 in the subject to and
future lease clauses, but the smaller fraction 1/32 in the granting clause
(1/4 times 1/8 = 1/32).69 As noted in Concord Oil, in light of the
language appearing in the subsequent clauses, that fraction, rather than
the smaller fraction in the granting clause, reflects the drafter's intent
about the size of the interest the grantor intended to convey.
a. The Court Declined to Follow the Kansas Approach Regarding the
Estate Misconception
To convince the Texas court to incorporate the estate misconception
into the interpretative process, Concord Oil pointed to Kansas decisions.
Specifically, in Shepard v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., the
Kansas Supreme Court construed a reservation in a deed that described
the size of the interest as "an undivided 1/4 of the landowners [sic] 1/8
royalty, or, 1/32 of the interest in and to all oil, gas or other
minerals .. . ."70 The court held the grantor had reserved a 1/4 mineral
interest.7 In reaching this conclusion, the court incorporated into its
interpretative process the pervasive confusion among "not only persons
67. Tipps v. Bodine, 101 S.W.2d 1076, 1079 (Tex. Ct. App. 1937); see also Concord Oil Co.,
966 S.W.2d at 464-65 (Tex. 1998) (Enoch, J., concurring) (blessing the use of different fractions to
convey a single interest); see also Burney, The RegrettableRebirth, supranote 12, at 102 (noting the
reliance on Tipps in interpreting multiclause deeds).
68. Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 453.
69. 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991). For a summary of the Luckel decision, see Burney,
Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 9-11 (rejecting the "granting clause
prevails" standard under Alford and instead relying on the presence or absence of a future lease
clause in determining the intent of the parties and the fraction conveyed).
70. 368 P.2d 19, 21 (Kan. 1962). The Shepard deed was not a multiclause deed form, but it
contained multiple fractions. The Shepard deed form involved "double and restated" fractions
discussed in the next section. See infra Part II.C.
71. Id. at 27. A preliminary issue the court addressed was whether the interest was mineral or
royalty. That aspect of the decision is discussed later in this article (the Kansas Supreme Court's
recent decision in Rucker).
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in the petroleum industry" but with courts:
As the most common leasing arrangement provides for a one-eighth
royalty reserved to the lessor, the confusion of fractional interests stems
primarily from the mistaken premise that all the lessor-land-owner
owns is a one-eighth royalty. In conveying minerals subject to an
existing lease ... mistake is often made in the fraction of thF2 minerals
conveyed by multiplying the intended fraction by one-eighth.
In Concord Oil, however, the Texas Supreme Court declined to fully
follow the Shepard approach. Instead, the court noted the estate
misconception, but viewed it as "instructive, but not dispositive."73 In
fact, the court declined to adopt any bright-line rules for this
interpretative issue, focusing instead on the lack of any two-grant
language in the 1937 deed.74
b.

Guidelines from ConcordOil's "Four-Corners" Approach

Yet, as I wrote in an earlier article, the Concord Oil opinion provided
"useful guidance to title examiners" for interpreting multiclause deeds:
First, according to the opinion, a deed with multiple fractions should
not be interpreted as making two grants unless express language to that
effect appears in the deed. Such language would include the phrases
'separate from' or 'in addition to,' phrases which were absent from the
Concord deed. Notably, [the additional clauses in multiclause deed
forms] do not contain such granting language. Therefore, multiclause
deed fms should rarely, if ever, be interpreted as making separate
grants.
Because of the multiple opinions in Concord Oil, title examiners
remained cautious about interpreting multiclause deed forms with
conflicting fractions. The concurring opinion created particular concern
In his opinion, Justice Enoch
by focusing on the future lease clause.
72. Id. at 26 (citing Magnusson v. Colorado Oil & Gas Corp., 331 P.2d 577, 583-84 (Kan.
1958)); see also Burney, InterpretingMineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 22 (noting the

pervasiveness of the 1/8 royalty in other jurisdictions). Shepard did not involve a multiclause deed
form; rather, the language fits the "restated" or "double fraction" problem I address in Part I.C.; see
also Heyen v. Hartnett, 679 P.2d 1152, 1157-58 (Kan. 1984) (construing deed with fractions 1/16
and 1/2 as conveying an undivided 1/2 mineral interest).
73.
74.
75.

Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 460.
Id at 460-61.
Burney, InterpretingMineral andRoyalty Deeds, supranote 8, at 16.

76. Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 464 (Enoch, J., concurring) ("Further, we were wrong to
conclude that the 'subject to' clause of the Crosby deed includes future leases."). For a complete
analysis of the concurring opinion, see Burney, InterpretingMineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note
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criticized the plurality opinion for having emphasized a future lease
clause in the deed as the basis for concluding the 1937 deed conveyed a
1/12 interest.77 However, the plurality opinion adopted a four-corners
approach and placed no significance on the presence or absence of any
clause, particularly a future lease clause. On the contrary, that opinion
states that the "decision in this case does not depend on the presence or
absence of a 'future lease' clause, which the court of appeals found
dispositive."n
2. Post-ConcordOil Decisions: The Demise of the "Two-Grant"
Doctrine
Despite these words from the Texas Supreme Court about the
relative insignificance of a future lease clause, a post-Concord Oil
appellate opinion considered it determinative. Neel v. Killam Oil Co. 79
involved a multiclause deed form that departed from the typical pattern.
Specifically, in the 1945 Neel deed, the larger fraction 1/2 appeared in
the granting clause and subject to clause, and the smaller fraction 1/16
appeared in the future lease clause.80 The parties agreed the interest was
a royalty interest, rather than a mineral interest. Regarding the size of
the interest, grantee's successor argued the deed conveyed a 1/2 royalty,
which would entitle the grantee to 1/2 of the royalty reserved in any
existing or future leases.82 To counter assertions that the granting clause
and future lease clause made separate grants, the grantee pointed to this
sentence in the deed's granting clause: "[t]his grant shall run forever."83
The controversy arose after the existing lease, with the typical 1/8
landowner's royalty, terminated and new leases were executed providing

8, at 17. Justice Enoch was also concerned with the "overconveyance" issue. See Concord Oil Co.,
966 S.W.2d at 464 (Tex. 1998) (Enoch, J., concurring); see also Burney, Interpreting Mineral and
Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 17 (explaining that a two-grant interpretation of the deed would
result in the grantor conveying more than he owned, which he cannot do).
77. Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 463-64 (Enoch, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 458-59 (plurality opinion).
79. 88 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. App. 2002), disapproved of by Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462,
469-70 (Tex. App. 2011).
80. Id at 339.
81. Id. at 339-40. The parties disagreed about whether this royalty interest was a fixed 1/16 or
a 1/2 royalty that entitled the owner to 1/2 of the royalty reserved in any lease. This "fixed" vs. "of'
royalty issue is common and addressed in Part II.C of this paper (double and restated fractions).
82. Id at 340.
83. Id
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for a 1/4 royalty. 84 The court of appeals ruled against the grantee,
holding the grantee was entitled to a fixed 1/16 interest in production
under the new leases as provided in the future lease clause.
In other
words, in Neel the court reverted to the two-grant doctrine.
In reaching this conclusion, the Neel court cited Concord Oil and
Luckel, explaining that those cases required it to seek the parties' intent
from the four corners of the document. However, the Neel opinion omits
any review of the two-grant saga, or of the specifics from Concord Oil,
such as the court's admonition that to create separate grants a deed should
contain clear evidence of such intent. Had the Neel court followed
Concord Oil's guidance, the deed would have been interpreted as
conveying the 1/2 "of' royalty forever as set forth in the granting clause.
The estate misconception explains the fraction in the future lease clause:
1/16 reflects the amount of production owed to the owner of a royalty
entitled to 1/2 of the 1/8 royalty reserved in the typical lease royalty
clause.
Although the Texas Supreme Court declined to review Neel, a recent
opinion from the same court of appeals "disapprove[d] of [its] analysis in
Neel."8 9 Hausserv. Cuellar involved a multiclause deed form that, like the
deed in Neel, contained conflicting fractions that departed from the
Concord Oil pattern.90 In Hausser, the clauses provided as follows:
granting clause: 1/2; subject to clause: 1/2; future lease clause: 1/16.91
After determining that the deed conveyed a royalty interest, the court

84. Id.
85. Id. at 341. Neel was heard by the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio, the same court
that decided Concord prior to its review by the Supreme Court. Burney, Oil, Gas & Mineral
Conveyances, supranote 10, at 24-25.
86. Burney, Oil, Gas & Mineral Conveyances, supra note 10, at 24-25.
87. Neel, 88 S.W.3d at 339-40; Burney, Oil, Gas & Mineral Conveyances, supra note 10, at
24-25 (opining that Luckel overruled Alford's "granting clause prevails" approach to multiclause
deeds with conflicting fractions but failed to clearly articulate the interpretative approach it had
adopted).
88. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
89. Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462, 470 (Tex. App. 2011) (pet. denied). In disapproving,
the court pointed to the Neel opinion's reliance on a previous deed, which could suggest the court
approved of Neel's focus on the future lease clause. Id Fortunately, the Hausseropinion embraced
Concord Oil's guidance and cited one of its previous opinions, Garza, which clearly rejected the
two-grant doctrine and incorporated the estate misconception into its analysis. See id. at 470-71
(citing Garza v. Prolithic Energy Co., 195 S.W.3d 137, 145 (Tex. App. 2006) (pet. denied)) (noting
the conflicting fractions arise due to the typical 1/8 royalty and confusion about what grantors
actually own).
90. Id.at470-71.
91. Idat465,468.
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considered whether it was a fixed 1/16 or a 1/2 royalty interest that entitled
the owner to 1/2 of the 1/4 landowner's royalty in new leases on the
property. 9 2 In adopting the 1/2 royalty option, the court cited its 2006
opinion in Garza v Prolithic Energy Co., and explained its analysis as
follows: "As in Garza, our decision is consistent with Concord Oil Co.
because the [Hausser] deed does not contain any language suggesting two
differing estates were being conveyed. Rather, the [Hausser] deed, like the
deeds in Garza, involves a single conveyance with fixed rights." 93
A dissenting opinion in Hausser argued that the future lease clause
should have controlled. 94 However, in light of the majority's disapproval
of Neel, its adherence to Concord Oil's guidelines, and other recent
appellate court decisions that acknowledge the role of the estate
misconception, 95 the two-grant doctrine should disappear in Texas.
Fortunately, other jurisdictions have wisely declined to adopt Texas's
approach.9 6 Therefore, title examiners may report, without exaggerating,
the death of the two-grant doctrine for interpreting multiclause deeds with
conflicting fractions in the shale era. Unfortunately, as described in the
next section, court opinions have not sufficiently incorporated the estate
misconception or the "legacy of the 1/8d' royalty" into the interpretative
process for related issues: deeds with double or restated fractions.

92. Id. at 470-71.
93. Id. at 470 (citing Garza v. Prolithic Energy Co., 195 S.W.3d 137, 146 (Tex. App. 2006);
Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tex. 1998)).
94. Id. at 472-73 (Marion, J., dissenting). Note that the same judge wrote the majority opinion
in Neel v. Killam Oil Co., Ltd., 88 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. App. 2002), disapproved of by Hausser,
345 S.W.3d at 470.
95. See Hamilton v. Morris Res., Ltd., 225 S.W.3d 336, 343-44 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (holding
that although there were differing fractions in the deed, only a single interest was actually
conveyed); Garza, 195 S.W.3d at 145 (noting the "problematic conflict between the granting of a
mineral interest and a future lease provision appearing to convey a smaller royalty interest"); see
also Coates Energy Trust v. Frost Nat'l Bank, No. 04-11-00838-CV, 2012 WL 5984693, at *6-7
(Tex. App. Nov. 28, 2012) (relying on Hausserin determining the fraction conveyed); Hernandez v.
El Paso Prod. Co., No. 13-09-184-CV, 2011 WL 1442991, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2011)
(taking notice of the estate misconception).
96. Burney, Oil, Gas & Mineral Conveyances, supra note 10, at 24 (describing the courts'
methods of dealing with mineral deeds); see also Bumey, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds,
supra note 8, at 23 ("[T]he Arkansas Supreme Court considered the issue that led the Texas courts
down the path to the creative two-grants rule....") (quoting Owen L. Anderson, Recent
Developments in NonregulatoryOil and Gas Law, 45 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N § 1.03[4], at
1-14 (1994)).
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"Double" or "Restated" Fractions-TheLegacy of the "Usual 1/8th
Landowner's Royalty"

Writing before the shale era, I addressed these two interpretative
issues: how should courts interpret deeds when the fractional interest
conveyed or reserved is expressed (1) as a double fraction, such as "1/2
of 1/8," or (2) as a restated fraction, such as "an undivided 1/2 nonparticipating royalty (being equal to, not less than an undivided 1/16).""
In one article, I note courts' failure to address the "legacy of the usual
1/8th landowner's royalty," which contributes to the estate
misconception, and its effect on drafting and interpreting double and
restated fractions.
Because parties focused on that royalty, they
expressed fractions with a double fraction, where one was invariably 1/8,
or by restating with a fraction equal to a multiple of 1/8, as in the restated
example above. 99 Rather than analyze that. legacy in light of other
language in the deed, courts tended to ignore it or merely multiply the
fractions.
For example, in a 1984 Texas Supreme Court case, Alford v. Krum,
the multiclause deed contained a double fraction, 1/2 of 1/8 in the
granting clause. 100 The court viewed that clause as conveying a 1/16
interest, without noting or analyzing this mode of expressing that single
fraction. ot This phenomenon, like the use of the fraction 8/8 to express
the term "all," appears only in the oil patch. And again, the legacy of the
usual 1/8 royalty explains the practice since one of the two fractions is
invariably the traditional 1/8 landowner's royalty. Yet in Alford and
other cases, court opinions multiply the fractions without analyzing the
reason for the formula.
Before Alford, proponents of the analysis approach had argued that
courts should incorporate the legacy of the 1/8 royalty into the
interpretative process for these fractional issues. 10 2 Under such an
97. Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 23-28; Burney, The
Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 12, at 89-97. The restated language in the example appeared in
Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. 1980) (holding deed ambiguous, which required
remand to trial court).
98. See generally Bumey, InterpretingMineraland Royalty Deeds, supranote 8.
99. See supra text accompanying note 35. See also Brown, 593 S.W.2d at 940 (finding the
deed in question restated the royalty as "[b]eing equal to, not less than an undivided 1/16th").
100. 671 S.W.2d 870, 873 (Tex. 1984), overruled by Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex.
1991).
101. Id at 873-74. Alford adopted the "granting clause" prevails rule for the multiclause deed
problem, but was subsequently overruled by Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 461.
102. Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 24 (citing Ernest E.
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approach, the double or restated fractions "should not be multiplied, but
analyzed to determine the parties' intent."' 03 Not all commentators agree
with this approach, however. Specifically, the Williams & Meyers
Treatise argues that double fractions should be multiplied under a plain
meaning approach to document interpretation.'"0 As described below,
recent court opinions also reflect contradictory opinions in resolving
these disputes.
1. Shale Era Cases
Demonstrating that shale-production surges produce title-litigation
surges, Texas courts recently have addressed several disputes involving
double and restated fractions. Most of these cases involve the grant or
reservation of royalty interests in which the dispute centers on one
question: whether the deed created a "fixed" or an "of' royalty interest.
A "fixed" royalty entitles the owner to a set share of the proceeds from
the sale of production, regardless of the fractional size of the landowner's
royalty in any lease. 05 An "of' royalty interest varies with the size of
the landowner's royalty in leases. 0 6 As demonstrated in the cases
Smith, Conveyancing Problems, STATE BAR OF TEX., ADVANCED OIL, GAS, & MINERAL LAW

COURSE G, G-2 (1981)).
103. Id. at 25. Not all commentators agree with this approach. See 2 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS &
CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 327.3, at 94.1 (2012) [hereinafter 2 WILLIAMS &
MEYERS].
104. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 103, § 327.3, at 94.1; Phillip E. Norvell,
Pitfalls in Developing Lands Burdenedby Non-ParticipatingRoyalty: Calculatingthe Royalty Share
and Coexisting with the Duty Owed to the Non-ParticipatingRoyalty Owner by the Executive, 48
ARK. L. REV. 933, 951 (1995). The author approves of the "multiply" approach used by the
Arkansas Supreme Court in Palmerv. Lide, in which the court held:
It will be seen that the deed refers not once but four times either to 1/8th of 1/8th of the
royalty or to 1/8th of 1/8th of the royalty to be retained or reserved in any oil, gas, or
mineral lease, leases, or contracts. It is not possible to interpret the unmistakably clear
language of the deed to mean 1/8th of 1/8th of the total production, as the appellant
would have us do.
567 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Ark. 1978). The author concludes that, "[o]ne cannot quarrel with the
construction of the 'double fraction' formula by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Lide
[sic] .... However, one is haunted by the fear that the 'horrors of the double fraction' may be the
result of an error based simply on the parties' selection of the wrong royalty deed form." Norvell,
supranote 104 at 951.
105. SMITH & WEAVER'S TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS, § 3.7, at 3-46 n.187.2.
106. See Range Res. Corp. v. Bradshaw, 266 S.W.3d 490, 493 (Tex. App. 2008) (comparing a
fraction "of' royalty versus a "fractional" royalty and stating that a fraction "of' royalty "'floats in
accordance with the size of the landowner's royalty contained in the lease"); see also WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, OIL AND GAS Law § 327 (2012) [hereinafter WILLIAMS & MEYERS]. There is an additional
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discussed below, these disputes arise when the royalty in a new lease
departs from the traditional 1/8 landowner's royalty.
Hudspeth v. Berry,107 a 2010 opinion, involved a dispute over a 1943
deed reserving an "undivided 1/40th royalty interest (being 1/5th of

1/8th)" with grantee reserving leasing rights, and the grantor receiving
1/5 of the usual 1/8 royalty. 08 The Berrys owned the reserved interest
and claimed their predecessors were each entitled to 1/5 of the 1/5
landowner's royalty reserved in a new lease, or 1/25 of the proceeds
from production.1 09 As a result, the Berrys claimed entitlement to a total
of 2/25 of the production proceeds."o The trial court agreed with the
Berrys' interpretation."' The court of appeals, however, held the deed
reserved two fixed 1/40 royalty interests, a ruling the Berrys did not
appeal to the Texas Supreme Court.1 12
However, an opinion decided two years before Berry addressed a
deed with similar language, including an express reference to a royalty
the size "of' the usual 1/8 lease royalty. The deed in that case, Range
Resources Corp. v. Bradshaw'13 reserved:
an undivided one-half (1/2) Royalty (Being equal to not less than an
undivided one-sixteent[h] (1/16)[)] of all the oil, gas and/or other

minerals . . . to be paid or delivered to said Grantors . . . free of cost
Forever ....
In the event oil, gas or other minerals are produced ...
Grantors ... shall receive not less than one-sixteenth (1/16) portion
(being equal t one-half (1/2) of the customary one-eighth (1/8)
Royalty) ....

Both the trial court and the court of appeals interpreted the
reservation as a fraction "of' royalty rather than as a "fixed" fractional
difference: the effect of the executive's duty to lease. With an "of' royalty, the executive could
potentially breach the duty of "utmost good faith" by negotiating a landowner's royalty that was too
low. See Bradshaw v. Steadfast Fin., LLC, 395 S.W.3d 348, 364-65 (Tex. App. 2013). If the
royalty interest is fixed, however, the negotiated royalty cannot affect the "fixed" owner's share of
production. See id (discussing cases in which the executive breached the duty of utmost good faith
by entering into a lease depriving the royalty owner of benefits they would have received in a lease
to a disinterested party).
107. No. 2-09-225-CV, 2010 WL 2813408 (Tex. App. July 15, 2010). In the interest of full
disclosure: I provided an expert opinion in support of Berry's position.
108. Id at *2.
109. Id. at *1.
110. Id.
111. Id
112. Id. at *4.
113. Range Res. Corp. v. Bradshaw, 266 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. App. 2008).
114. Id. at 493-94 (emphasis added).
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royalty.s15 The appellate court opinion contains an extensive discussion
of the difference between the two types of interests and reviews a 1980
Texas Supreme Court case involving a reservation that raised the
"restated" fraction problem.' 16 In that case, Brown v. Havard, the
majority concluded that the deed was ambiguous, but the dissent viewed
the deed as having unambiguously created a fraction "of' royalty.' 17 In
Range Resources, the court addressed differences between the two deeds,
but ultimately favored the dissent's approach in Brown.'18 The losing
party in Range Resources asked the Texas Supreme Court to review the
appellate court decision, but the court declined its petition.119
A case decided in 2011 appears consistent with Range Resources
rather than Berry. In Sundance Minerals v. Moore, a deed reserved "an
undivided and non-participating one-halfinterest in the oil, gas and other
mineral rights" or "one half of the usual one eighth royalty received
forsuch [sic] oil, gas and other minerals produced . . . .120 The court
held the deed reserved 1/2 "of' the 1/5 landowner's royalty in the

subsequent lease. 12 1
Although the result in Sundance Minerals reflects the analysis
approach, that opinion, like the Range Resources opinion, does not
overtly address the estate misconception or the legacy of the 1/8 royalty.
However, in reaching their conclusions both opinions cite extensively to

115. Id. at 497.
116. See id. at 493-97 (discussing Brown v. Havard,593 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1980)).
117 593 S.W.2d 939, 942, 945 (McGee, J., dissenting).
118. Range Res. Corp., 266 S.W.3d at 495-96. The initial dispute in Range Resources was
whether the executive had breached its duty to the royalty owner by entering into a lease with only a
1/8 landowner's royalty. Id. at 492. That duty, however, has no application to a "fixed" royalty
interest since leasing cannot affect the share owed to those interest owners. See id. at 493. The duty
applies when the interest is a fraction "of' the lease royalty, since the executive must exercise
leasing decisions according to an "utmost good faith" standard. See Bradshaw v. Steadfast Fin.,
LLC, 395 S.W.3d 348, 370 (Tex. App. 2013) (noting that when the interest is a fraction "of' the
lease royalty, the executive has more control and, therefore, is under an elevated duty). In Range
Resources, the royalty owner claimed the executive could have negotiated for 1/4 landowner's
royalty in the lease. 266 S.W.3d at 492. The executive's duty is addressed below (Lesley
discussion). See infra Part V.
119. Petition for Review of Range Resources Corporation and Range Production I, L.P., Range
Res. Corp. v. Bradshaw (Tex. Dec. 28, 2008) (No. 08-0949) (pet. denied), available at
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/ebriefs/08/08094901.pdf
120. 354 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. App. 2011) (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 512-13 (affirming trial court's grant of summary judgment interpreting that the deed
reserved 1/2 of the 115 royalty).
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Luckel v. White and follow its harmonizing approach.122 That 1991
Texas Supreme Court opinion, in which the court interpreted a deed with
the conflicting fractions 1/4 and 1/32, expressly acknowledges the effect
of the 1/8 royalty on drafting:
We do not quarrel with the assumption that the parties probably
contemplated nothing other than the usual one-eighth royalty. But that
assumption does not lead to the conclusion that the parties intended
only a fixed 1/32nd interest. It is just as logical to conclude that the
parties intended to convey one-fourth of all reserved royalty, and that
the reference to 1/32nd in the first three clauses is "haionized"
because one-fourth of the usual one-eighth royalty is 1/32nd.
As in Range Resources, the losing party in Sundance Minerals
petitioned the Texas Supreme Court to review the appellate court's
ruling. That petition stressed the surge of shale production in Texas and
the decline of the usual 1/8 landowner's royalty, and asked the court to
provide guidance:
Practitioners and lower courts dealing with the resurgence of cases
need guidance on significant, recurring issues like the deed
construction dispute presented in this petition for review. Especially
when language in deeds use differing fractions to express the intent of
the parties regarding the character and size of the interest reserved, it is
vitally important that all of the reviewing courts consistently apply the
rules of intewketation and follow established precedent to reach the
same results.
Despite this plea for guidance, the Texas Supreme Court declined to
review the court of appeals' decision in Sundance Minerals. The court
also denied a petition for review in another appellate opinion from 2012,
Coghill v. Griffith.125 That opinion relies heavily on Luckel and cites
Range Resources in concluding that a deed with restated and double

122. See, e.g., Range Res. Corp., 266 S.W.3d at 496 ("Construing the deeds as a whole, and
harmonizing all parts to give effect to the parties' intent, we determine that a 'fraction of royalty'
was conveyed."); Sundance Minerals v. Moore, 354 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex. App. 2011) ("All parts
of the deed are to be harmonized, construing the instrument to give effect to all of its provisions.").
123. Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. 1991).
124. Petition for Review of Sundance Minerals, L.P., at vii, Sundance Minerals, L.P. v. Moore,
354 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. 2012) (No. 02-10-00403-CV) (pet. denied), available at
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/ebriefs/12/12007801.pdf.
125. Petition for Review of Coghill v. Griffith, 358 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. App. 2012) (No.12-0170)
(pet. denied), availableat (http://data.scotxblog.com/scotx/no/12-0170.
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fractions created an "of' royalty interest.126
However, another recent opinion retreats to the "multiply" approach.
In Moore v. Noble Energy, the court viewed the following language as
creating a fixed 1/16 royalty interest: "a one-half non-participating
royalty interest (one-half of one-eighth of production)."1 2 7 In that
opinion, the court relies heavily on the Williams & Meyers treatise,
which approves of multiplying rather than analyzing double fractions,
and attempts, unsatisfactorily, to distinguish Range Resources.128
Another recent appellate court opinion also strains to distinguish
Range Resources and Sundance Minerals and, like the Moore opinion,
retreats to the multiply approach. 12 9 Wynne/Jackson Development v.
PAC Holdings, Ltd., involves Barnett shale production from property in
Denton County, Texas.130 The relevant language provided that the
grantor reserved:
a non-participating royalty of one-half (1/2) of the usual one-eighth
(1/8) royalty in and to all oil, gas, and other materials produced, saved
and sold from the above-described property, provided, however, that
although said reserved royalty is non-participating and Grantee shall
own and possess all leasing rights in and to all oil, gas and other
minerals, Grantor shall, nevertheless, have the right to receive one-half
(1/2) of any bonus, overriding royalty interest, or other payments,
similar or dissimilar, payable under the terms ofiny oil, gas and
mineral lease covering the above-described property.
The parties framed the issue as whether the deed reserved a fixed or

126. Id. at 838-40 ("The language used in Range Resources Corp. and in the instant case
establishes that the interest reserved was a fraction of royalty and not a fractional royalty."). The
deed's language stated, "the Grantor reserves and excepts unto himself ... an undivided one-eighth
(1/8) of all royalties payable under the terms of said lease, as well as an undivided one-eighth (1/8)
of the usual one-eighth (1/8) royalties provided for in any future" lease. Id at 836.
127. 374 S.W.3d 644, 645 (Tex. App. 2012) (emphasis added).
128. See id. at 647-51. The court also relied on Brown v. Havard,593 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. 1980).
In Brown, a deed reserved "an undivided one-half non-participating royalty (being equal to, not less
than an undivided 1/16th) . . . ." Id. at 940. The majority opinion determined the deed was
ambiguous and returned the case to the trial court. Id. at 944. A dissenting opinion, however,
argued that the deed was unambiguous and conveyed a 1/2 "of' royalty. Id. at 945 (McGee, J.,
dissenting).
129. Wynne/Jackson Dev., L.P. v. PAC Capital Holdings, Ltd., No. 13-12-00449-CV, 2013 WL
2470898, at *3 (Tex. App. June 6, 2013).
130. Id.at*1.
131. Id. at *4.
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fraction "of' royalty.132 In reversing the trial court and holding the deed
reserved a fixed fractional royalty, the court relied on cases, such as a
1955 Texas Supreme Court decision, that multiplied, rather than
analyzed, double fractions.133 In other words, unlike Range Resources
and Sundance Minerals, the Wynne/Jackson decision ignores the legacy
of the usual 1/8 landowner's royalty, despite the express reference to that
royalty in the deed.
2.

Lessons from the Double and Restated Fraction Cases for the Shale
Era

The results reached in Sundance Minerals, Range Resources, and
Coghill reflect the analysis approach for double and restated fractions.1 34
That approach respects the goal of deed interpretation, which is to
ascertain the intent of the parties. The analysis approach also promotes
title stability by seeking intent from the four corners of the deeds,
without resorting to outside evidence. Sundance Minerals, Range
Resources, and Coghill reach results consistent with language within the
deeds. Specifically, the deeds in each of those cases mention the "usual
132. The appellate opinion does not suggest that the deed reserved an undivided 1/2 nonexecutive mineral interest, perhaps in light of the "non-participating royalty" label. Id. at *4-5. The
owner of an undivided 1/2 mineral interest is entitled to 1/2 of the royalty, as explained above. See
supra Part II.C.I. However, under the French redundancy approach, which focuses on express
references to other mineral estate attributes, that may have been a viable argument. See id. at *3
(comparing the attributes of the mineral estate owned by a mineral fee owner with those of a nonparticipating royalty owner). Here, the grantor reserved a royalty plus the right to receive bonus
payments, a mineral-estate attribute. Id. at *4; see also Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tex.
1986) (finding that the deed, which stripped some mineral-estate attributes, created a non-executive
mineral interest rather than royalty interest). The Altman deed, however, did not expressly label the
interest a "non-participating royalty interest." Id. at 118 (referring instead to a non-participating
mineral interest).
133. The court cited Harriss v. Ritter, a case which held that the double fractions "'one-half of
one-eighth . .. could have but one meaning and that is 1/16th of the royalty . . . .' Wynne/Jackson,
2013 WL 2470898, at *4 (quoting Harriss v. Ritter, 279 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. 1955)).
134. Sundance Minerals v. Moore, 354 S.W.3d 507, 511-13 (Tex. App. 2011) (employing only
"the express language found within the four corners of [the deed]" to determine the interested the
parties intended to convey); Range Res. Corp. v. Bradshaw, 266 S.W.3d 490, 493, 496-97 (Tex.
App. 2008) (looking exclusively to "the objective intent expressed or apparent in the writing" to
determine the royalty conveyed); Coghill v. Griffith, 358 S.W.3d 834, 836-40 (Tex. App. 2012)
(also using the four corners rule to determine the parties intended to grant a fraction of royalty).
Another recent case, which is not reported, expressly endorses the analysis approach and
consideration of the "estate misconception." See Hernandez v. El Paso Prod. Co., No. 13-09-184CV, 2011 WL 1442991, at *4 (Tex. App. Apr. 14, 2011) (citing Laura H. Bumey, The Regrettable
Rebirth ofthe Two-Grant Doctrine in Texas Deed Construction,34 S. TEX. L. REv. 73, 86 (1993)).
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1/8 lease royalty" and describe the interest at issue as a fraction "of' that
royalty.13 '
By noting those provisions and relying on Luckel's
"harmonizing" approach, those opinions incorporate the legacy of that
once-common royalty on drafting into the interpretative process.
The Berry, Moore, and Wynne/Jackson opinions, on the other hand,
ignore express references to the "usual 1/8 royalty" and other language,
including the reference to a 1/5 interest in Berry and a 1/2 interest in
Moore and Wynne/Jackson. 136 Further departing from the four-corners
rule, the Moore and Wynne/Jackson opinions insert language not found
in the document-the fraction 1/16.137 In short, these three decisions
merely multiply and fail to analyze the language in the deeds.
For future drafting, the decisions discussed above and others teach
these lessons: drafters should state expressly whether they intend to
convey or reserve a "fixed fractional interest" rather than a fraction "of'
the royalty reserved in existing and any future leases. An additional
statement should expressly clarify that, for instance, a fraction is not a
"fixed" interest, if an "of' royalty interest is intended. And the size of
that "fraction 'of royalty" or "fixed royalty" should be stated as a single
rather than a double fraction.
However, as a Texas court noted in Barker v. Levy when reviewing
drafting advice regarding the "mineral or royalty" issue, discussed
below, "It is quite probable that these [parties] now heartily agree with
135. See, e.g., Sundance Minerals, 354 S.W.3d at 511-12 (finding that the grantor meant to
reserve "one half of the usual one eighth" royalty); Range Res. Corp., 266 S.W.3d, at 493 (noting the
problems the estate misconception played in deed construction); Coghill, 358 S.W.3d at 838-39
(harmonizing the differing fractions in the deed in light of the usual 1/8 royalty).
136. Hudspeth v. Berry, No. 2-09-225-CV, 2010 WL 2813408, at *1 (Tex. App. July 15, 2010)
(interpreting the deed as granting two fixed royalty interest instead of the "1/5th of 1/8th" royalty);
Moore v. Noble Energy, Inc., 374 S.W. 3d 644, 651 (Tex. App. 2012) (interpreting the deed to
"reserve a royalty of one-half of one-eighth of production, or one-sixteenth"); Wynne/Jackson, 2013
WL 2470898, at *1-2, *5 (Tex. App. June 6, 2013) (finding that the interest conveyed was a
fractional royalty, not a fraction of royalty and entitled Wynne/Jackson to one sixteenth of
production instead of 1/2 of the usual 1/8 royalty).
137. See Moore, 374 S.W.3d at 647-48 (Tex. App. 2012) (relying on MARTIN & KRAMER,
supra note 35, to insert language into the deed). The Moore opinion also diverts to another troubled
interpretative trail: the court views the lack of a producing well at the time the deed was drafted as
relevant to interpreting the deed. Id. at 651. However, as discussed in the next section, allowing
such extraneous facts to affect the interpretative process detracts from title stability. See infra
discussion Part m.B.1.b. (analyzing Oklahoma approach, which allows the term "royalty" to change
depending on existence of lease at time of drafting). See also Wynne/Jackson, 2013 WL 2470898, at
*1-2, *5 (interpreting deed language describing a 'one-half (1/2) of the usual one-eighth (1/8)
royalty in and to all oil, gas and minerals, produced, saved and sold from [such property]' as
granting a fixed royalty of 1/16 of the production).
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this advice. However, it was written [decades] too late to have been
helpful" in the shale era. 38 Title examiners could view the Texas
Supreme Court's decisions declining petitions for review in Sundance
Minerals, Range Resources and Coghill as approval of those better-

reasoned opinions. 3 9 The Texas Supreme Court's opinions in Luckel
and Concord Oil also support the approach in those three cases by
acknowledging the legacy of the 1/8 royalty.14 0 Absent firmer
endorsement from the state's high court, however, these mixed opinions
may motivate parties to file lawsuits over deeds with double and restated
fractions in the shale era.
III. THE "MINERAL OR ROYALTY" QUESTION
As noted above, in addition to the decision about the size of the
fractional interest a grantor intends to create, drafters must decide
whether to create a mineral or royalty interest. In fact, several of the
fractional-interest cases discussed above also involved this second
inquiry.141 This section examines the drafting advice provided in Barker,
which encourages the use of the "mineral" or "royalty" labels, and
contributes additional statements for distinguishing between the two.14 2
A. The Value of the "Mineral" or "Royalty" Label in Draftingand
InterpretingDeeds

Although the Barker advice appears in a 1974 case and quotes from
a 1958 article, its suggestion to use mineral and royalty labels has merit

138. Barker v. Levy, 507 S.W.2d 613, 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
139. The same reasoning would apply to the Texas Supreme Court's decision not to accept
petitions for the multiclause deed cases, Garza and Hausser. But see TEX. R. APP. P. 56.1 (noting
that petitions denied do not carry the same precedential value as petitions refused, which are viewed
as Supreme Court opinions).
140. See Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. 1991) (discussing the "usual one-eighth
royalty"); Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 459 (Tex. 1998)
(noting that the prevailing royalty in private oil and gas leases was a 1/8 royalty during the Era in
which the Concord deed was executed).
141. Hausser v. Cuellar, 345 S.W.3d 462, 468 (Tex. App. 2011) (noting that "after determining
both deeds conveyed a mineral interest as opposed to a royalty interest, [the court] addressed the
issue of the conflicting fractions"); Garza v. Prolithic Energy Co., 195 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. App.
2006) (deciding first that "the deeds conveyed a mineral interest" before addressing the conflicting
fractions).
142. Barker v. Levy, 507 S.W.2d 613, 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
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today. 14 3 However, in order to pick a label, drafters must engage in two
prior steps in the decision-making process. First, drafters should
examine the differences between mineral and royalty interests; and,
second, they should decide which type they prefer to create. However,
as noted in Barker, this drafting advice comes too late for title examiners
today faced with interpreting decades-old deeds. 14 4 Complicating the
interpretative process, decades of decisions from different states provide
differing advice about the appropriate language for creating each type of
interest. This section reviews the differences between mineral and
royalty interests and the value of these labels in the interpretative
process.
1. The Difference between Mineral and Royalty Interests: The Bundle
of Sticks
Theoretically, drafters in the shale era should understand the
differences between mineral and royalty interests. Courts articulate those
differences by analogizing to the classic property law concept, "the
bundle of sticks."l 45 Specifically, the sticks in the mineral-estate bundle
consist of the following: "(1) the right to develop (the right of ingress
and egress), (2) the right to lease (the executive right), (3) the right to
receive bonus payments, (4) the right to receive delay rentals, [and]
(5)the right to receive [landowner's] royalty payments."l 46 Stated
differently, a mineral interest is a cost-bearing interest that entitles the
owner to a proportionate share of lease benefits, including bonus, rentals,
and landowner's royalty.
143.

Id. (quoting Emery, Conveyancing ofInterests in Oil and Gas, 29 Okla. B.J. 1965 (1958))

(advising that deeds conveying royalties should contain language stating "'it is the intention of the
parties hereto to convey a royalty interest as distinguished from a mineral interest"').
144. Id. (noting, in particular, that Emery's drafting advice came "twenty-eight years too late to
have been helpful" in interpreting the Barker deed).
145. See, e.g., Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 352 S.W.3d 479, 480-81 (Tex. 2011)
(stating that the "right to lease minerals-the executive right-is one 'stick' in the bundle of five real
property rights that comprise a mineral estate"). Courts and commentators also refer to the "sticks"
that comprise a mineral interest as the incidents or attributes of the mineral estate. See, e.g., Altman
v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. 1986) (listing the "five essential attributes of a severed mineral
estate"); Hamilton v. Morris Resources, Ltd., 225 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. App. 2007). See generally
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 106, § 202.2. Pennsylvania is a major shale-era state with
relatively little case law for resolving shale era disputes, including the "magic words" for creating
mineral and royalty interests. Id; see also infra Part IV.A (examining the effect of old Pennsylvania
precedent on the meaning of "minerals").
146. Altman, 712 S.W.2d at 118.
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A royalty interest, on the other hand, is a non-cost bearing interest
devoid of the mineral-estate sticks, except the right to share in proceeds
from the sale of production.14 7 In other words, a "royalty" is non-cost
bearing and non-participating interest, meaning the owner cannot execute
leases or develop the property. When an owner creates a royalty interest
by deed or reservation, the label "non-participating royalty interest"
applies, which distinguishes that interest from mineral interests and from
the royalty reserved in the lease. 148
2. The Nonparticipating Royalty Interest vs. Mineral Interest
(Participating and Non-Executive): The Well-Drafted Form in the
Shale Era
Proceeding with the ideal pre-drafting decision-making process, after
reviewing the differences between a royalty and mineral interest, Owner
would consider additional questions. Does Owner intend for Grantee to
have the right to execute leases and share in lease benefits? Or does
Owner prefer to create an non-participating royalty interest that may
simply someday entitle Grantee to a share of production? Additional
questions include whether Owner prefers to maintain all leasing rights in
the property, even if he intends to convey a mineral interest, which is a
viable option because the "sticks" in the mineral estate bundle are
severable. Indeed, as discussed below, Owners often sever the executive
right and create non-executive or non-participating mineral interests. 49
In those instances, Owner maintains the right to lease the entire mineral
estate, but Grantee shares proportionately in lease benefits, such as rents
and royalties. 50
Assuming Owner has proceeded through this process and selected
the interest he intends to create, the next question is which language
should Owner insert in the deed? At this point, the advice suggested in
Barker warrants repeating: "good draftsmanship requires that where a
conveyance of a royalty is intended, [t]here should be added the proviso

147. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 35, at 964 (noting the characteristics of a royalty
interest).
148. See id. at 698 (noting the characteristics of a non-participating royalty interest); Hamilton,
225 S.W.3d at 344 (defining the properties of a non-participating royalty interest).
149. See infra Part V.D.
150. Altman, 712 S.W.2d at 118-20 (noting that the deed reserved the rights to lease and receive
royalty to the grantor but that the grantees were entitled to a fraction of the royalty reserved under
the lease).
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that 'it is the intention of the parties hereto to convey a royalty interest as
distinguished from a mineral interest.""s
Fortunately, many deed forms today embrace that advice and
consistently adopt the mineral or royalty labels. Non-participating
royalty is now an industry-accepted term.152 Additionally, well-drafted
forms include other phrases endorsed in case law for creating mineral
versus royalty interests. For example, courts have equated the phrase "in
and under" with the creation of a mineral interest and that phrase appears
in mineral deed forms.1 53 Ideally, forms today avoid contradictory terms,
such as combining the royalty label with an express grant of "ingress and
egress," a stick in the mineral estate bundle.154 As discussed below,
however, drafters of new deeds should check whether forms reflect the
dictates of case law. The next section examines precedent affecting the
mineral or royalty question.
B. The "PrecedentProblem" and the "Mineralor Royalty" Question in
the Shale Era
1. The Texas v. Oklahoma Approaches
Although title examiners prefer to encounter the ideal forms
described above, courthouses across the country contain countless deeds
with contradictory and confusing terms.
Litigation over the
interpretation of those deeds has produced often misguided opinions,
creating a precedent problem for title examiners and courts in the shale
era. In many disputes, courts accord great weight to the royalty label in
the deed interpretation process.15 5 However, to understate the problem, if
"the word 'royalty' is coupled with other terms, the result is not always
clear." 1 s6 Additionally, other jurisdictions, notably Oklahoma, allow the
151. Barker v. Levy, 507 S.W.2d 613, 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (internal citation omitted).
152. The deed form in this case clearly created a non-participating royalty interest and avoided
the "mineral or royalty" question. See 11 TEX. PRAC., TEXAS METHODS OF PRACTICE § 16:21 (3d
ed. 2013) (form for nonparticipating royalty interest deed).
153. See, e.g., 6 WILLIAM B. BURFORD, WEST'S TEXAS FORMS: MINERALS, OIL & GAS § 1:3
(4th ed. 2012) (form using "in and under" to create a mineral interest).
154. See 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 103, § 304.2-4.8 (describing the various phrases
that are associated with a royalty interest).
155.

See generally HEMINGWAY ET AL., OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 80 (4th ed. 2004)

(noting that in many jurisdictions, "the presence of the term 'royalty' may convert what is otherwise
a mineral interest to one of royalty only").
156. Id.
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meaning of royalty to change depending on whether a lease was
outstanding on the property.157
a. Texas
Writers often note that other states look to Texas law for guidance in
resolving oil and gas disputes.'58 Indeed, as the nation's second largest
state with a long and strong production history from millions of primarily
private acres of land, Texas has produced volumes of case law on a
variety of issues. Historically, dozens of Texas decisions have addressed
the mineral or royalty inquiry. 59 However, the Texas Supreme Court
last addressed that question in two cases from the 1990s, French v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.o60 in 1995 and Temple-Inland Forest Products
Corp. v. Henderson Family Partnership'6 ' in 1997. The deeds at issue in

those cases presented the problem of the "royalty" label mixed with
mineral terms. The French deed was titled "mineral deed." 6 2 Yet titles
of documents carry little weight in the interpretative process.'6 3
However, the deed also included the mineral phrase, "in, under and that
may be produced from .... 16 4 The confusion arose in a second
paragraph, which expressly stated that the "conveyance is a royalty
interest only," and continued to strip from the conveyance all of the
sticks in the mineral estate bundle, except the right to receive a fixed
fractional share of production.'65 That fixed fraction, which appeared in
the granting clause, was stated as "being an undivided 1/656.17th"
157. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
158. Kurth, supra note 4, 4-1 at § 4.09; Rebecca W. Watson, Hydraulic Fracturing as a
Subsurface Trespass: Will Texas Precedent Lead the Way, 49 ROCKY MTN MIN. L. FOUND. J. 235,

235 (2012). Not all states decide to follow Texas's lead on resolving oil and gas disputes. See, e.g.,
Garman v. Conoco, Inc., 886 P.2d 652, 657, 660 (Colo. 1994) (noting Texas approach charging
landowner with share of post-production costs under market value royalty provision and rejecting it).
159. Dozens of articles and treatises have also addressed the issue. See, e.g., HEMINGWAY,
supra note 155, at 80-81 (discussing the role of a deed's language in determining whether a mineral
or royalty interest has been conveyed); Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note
8, at 2. See generally Richard C. Maxwell, Mineral or Royalty-The French Percentage, 49 SMU L.

REv. 543 (1996).
160. 896 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1995).
161. 958 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1997).
162. French, 896 S.W.2d at 796.
163. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 106, at § 304.1, at 467-68) ("The title of the instrument
is never given conclusive effect in the construction process and rarely, if ever, has paramount
importance.").
164. French, 896 S.W.2d at 796.
165. Id.
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interest.166
The parties disputed whether the deed conveyed a mineral interest or
a fixed fractional royalty interest.167 The difference in monetary terms
was significant: if the deed conveyed a fixed fractional royalty, the
grantee's successor-in-interest was entitled to that fixed share of the
proceeds from the sale of the production.' 6 8 On the other hand, if the
deed conveyed only a 1/656.17 fractional mineral interest, the grantee's
cost-bearing interest must be multiplied by the 1/8 landowner's royalty in
the lease, meaning the owner received 1/5248 of the proceeds.169
The Texas Supreme Court held the deed conveyed a mineral
interest.o7 0 In reaching its conclusion, the court applied what critics
labeled a redundancy approach. 17 ' According to the court, the interest
described was not a royalty interest because the express language
removing the attributes of the mineral estate "would serve no purpose
whatsoever if the interests in minerals being conveyed was a 1/656.17
royalty interest, that is, 1/656.17 of all production."1 72
For drafting after 1995, French taught these lessons: if Owner
intends to convey a royalty interest, use that term, avoid contradictory
mineral phrases, such as "in and under," and omit any reference to the
attributes of the mineral estate.' 73 As always, however, such advice
comes too late for title examiners faced with determining the meaning of
existing deeds. Fortunately, the Texas Supreme Court revisited French
two years later in Temple-Inland and produced an opinion that assuaged
166. Id. The granting clause also described the interests as "an undivided Fifty (50) acre
interest," a fact that the court pointed to in reaching its conclusion that the deed created a mineral
interest. Id. at 797-98.
167. Id. at 796.
168. Id. (noting that the grantee's successor maintained that "the deed conveyed a pure fixed
royalty interest . . . [in] production").
169.

Burney, Oil, Gas & Mineral Conveyances, supra note 10, at 7.

170.

French, 896 S.W.2d at 798.

Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 34 (citing David E.
171.
Pierce, Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law: The Continuing Search for Analytical
Foundations, 47 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAx'N 1-1, 1-18 (1996)).
172. French, 896 S.W.2d at 798.

173.

One writer suggests using the royalty label multiple times. See Terry Cross, Why Texas

Titles are Diferent, 4 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. 16 (2007) ("Temple-Inland opinion awards

cumulative points for repeating a key word six times. If saying the same thing over six times adds
certainty in this treacherous area, who can afford not to do it? Simply saying, 'this conveyance is a
royalty interest' only once was insufficient to create a royalty interest under French v. Chevron."
(citing Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp. v. Henderson Family P'shp, Ltd., 958 S.W.2d 183, 186
(Tex. 1997))).
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the concerns of critics, who viewed French as having incorrectly ignored
the "royalty" label in the interpretation process.174
The Temple-Inland deed involved a'reservation of a 1/16 interest.175
As in French, initial language in the reservation reflected a mineral
interest. However, the deed continued to repeatedly describe the interest
as "royalty," and specifically described it as non-cost bearing.'7 6
Although the court did not overrule French, it effectively limited it to its
facts.'" Therefore, in future disputes, one could infer that the royalty
label should carry weight in the interpretative process. However, the
Texas Supreme Court focused on the particular language in the TempleInland deed, and avoided sweeping statements about the value of the
royalty label in general.7 7 Therefore, parties whose rights depend on
deeds with mixed mineral and royalty terms will remain motivated to
litigate in the shale era.

174. See Bumey, InterpretingMineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 34 (opining that the
French court ignored prior case law that had given weight to the royalty label and instead should
have viewed the language removing the mineral-estate attributes as affirming the royalty label).
175. 958 S.W.2d at 184. The issue in the case was whether a deed had reserved a mineral or a
royalty interest. Id. at 183-84. An unanswered question from the opinion is why the deed expressly
conveyed a 15/16 mineral interest. Id. at 184. In other words, who is the owner of the other 1/16
mineral interest? The appellate court had focused on this fact in holding that the deed must have
reserved a 1/16 mineral interest. Temple-Inland Forest Products Corp. v. Henderson Family P'ship,
Ltd., 911 S.W.2d 531, 534 (Tex. App. 1995) (discussing what percentage of the mineral interest was
retained), rev'd, 958 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1997); see also Burney, InterpretingMineral and Royalty
Deeds, supra note 8, at 42-43 (noting that the Supreme Court did not answer the obvious question of
who owned the 1/16 mineral interest).
176. Temple-Inland, 958 S.W.2d at 184.
177. Burney, Interpreting Mineral and Royalty Deeds, supra note 8, at 41. In particular, the
court addressed the French opinion's approach to Watkins v. Slaughter. Temple-Inland, 958 S.W.2d
at 185. The French opinion viewed Watkins as requiring not only the term "royalty" but also the
additional phrase from "actual production." French, 896 S.W.2d at 797. The Temple-Inland
opinion clarified that the 'royalty' label-without the phrase 'from actual production'-is a reliable
indicator of intent when interpreting and drafting deeds." Burney, Interpreting Mineraland Royalty
Deeds, supra note 8, at 42; see also Temple-Inland, 958 S.W.2d at 186 (distinguishing the language
from French that the words "royalty from actual production" are not required). However, a recent
Texas case relied on the "redundancy analysis" from French to hold a multiclause deed form
conveyed a stripped mineral interest. Garza v. Prolithic Energy Co., 195 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex.
App. 2006). "Furthermore, the reservation of the [mineral estate attributes] would have been
redundant if the deeds intended to convey a royalty interest. Therefore ... . we hold that the deeds
conveyed a mineral interest." Id
178. Temple-Inland,958 S.W.2d at 184-85.

2013]

OIL, GAS, AND MINERAL TITLES

129

b. Oklahoma
In resolving the mineral or royalty, question, Texas courts have
properly not considered whether a lease existed on the property at the
time the deed was executed.' 7 9 Unfortunately, that approach has been
adopted in some jurisdictions, notably Oklahoma:
The Oklahoma courts have been consistent in following the approach
that the existence of a lease on the property at the time of execution of a
deed indicates an intent that a royalty interest was created, and that the
word 'royalty' in those cases should be construed in a narrow sense.
Where no lease was outstanding qqhe time, the broader construction of
mineral interest has been applied.
Scholars have consistently criticized the Oklahoma approach for
creating title uncertainty and drafting problems:
The average lawyer often has difficulty in understanding the difference
between a royalty and a mineral interest. The Oklahoma cases further
complicate such a lawyer's task by requiring him or her to determine
which of several meanings a term may have. ThVynevitable result has
been litigation and a small, highly specialized bar.
c.

Drafting Lessons from the Texas and Oklahoma Approaches

In the shale era, drafters should accord the terms "mineral" and
"royalty" set meanings that reflect the bundle of sticks concept. Texas
courts have, for the most part, endorsed that approach, which provides
predictability for title examiners. Texas courts also ensure predictability
and title certainty by resolving the mineral or royalty question from the

179. In some Texas opinions, however, courts appear to be influenced by whether or not a lease
was on the property. See Moore v. Noble Energy, Inc., 374 S.W.3d .644, 647 (Tex. App. 2012)
("The centerpiece of the Moores' argument is the contention that the deed reasonably can be
construed to reserve a royalty of one-half the royalty retained by the lessor in a future lease."). But
see Barker v. Levy, 507 S.W.2d 613, 617 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) ("[T]here is no requirement in
Texas law that a lease be in effect before a royalty interest can be created.").
180. HEMINGWAY, supra note 155, at 76 (quoting Richard Hemingway, Mineral-Royalty
Distinctionin Oklahoma, 52 Okla. B.J. 2791, 2795 (1981); see, e.g., Melton v. Sneed, 109 P.2d 509,
512-13 (Okla. 1940) (holding the deed ambiguous and establishing a rule of construction that a
royalty term creates a mineral interest if no reference appears in the deed to any lease). Other
jurisdictions may focus on the presence or absence of a lease, for varying reasons. See generally
HEMINGWAY, supra note 155, at 72-78 (discussing approaches used in West Virginia, Colorado and
other jurisdictions).
181. HEMINGWAY, supra note 155, at 77.
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four corners of the document as a matter of law. On the contrary, the
Oklahoma cases have concluded the deeds were ambiguous, which
requires factual determinations regarding the presence or absence of a
lease in the trial court before meaning can be assigned to a deed.18 2
In response to the Oklahoma cases, drafters in that state should heed
the Barker advice and add a sentence clarifying that a royalty interest,
not a mineral interest, is intended, regardless of the presence or absence
of a lease.183 For title examiners, owners and courts, however, the
Oklahoma approach will continue to affect deed interpretation cases in
the shale era, in that state and possibly others. A recent North Dakota
case provides an example. In Hamilton v. Woll, the North Dakota
Supreme Court held fifteen 1950s deeds were ambiguous.184 The deeds
contained mixed terms and other deeds executed by the grantor had
previously been litigated.'85 The proponent of the mineral interpretation
pointed to the fact that the grantor "was from Oklahoma and during the
time the 15 deeds were executed it was 'a matter of common knowledge'
that 'the word [royalty] [wa]s frequently used in [Oklahoma] to denote
an interest in the mineral rights.', 6 While Hamilton may be limited to
its facts, shale-producing states writing on cleaner precedent plates
should avoid the Oklahoma path in favor of the Texas approach for
resolving the mineral or royalty question.' 87
2. The Kansas Approach: Avoiding Non-Participating Royalty Interests
and the Rule Against Perpetuities
While Oklahoma courts have focused on the presence or absence of
an oil and gas lease in the mineral or royalty analysis, another fact plays
a role in Kansas decisions: the need to avoid application of the common
law rule against perpetuities. Under basic property law principles, the
rule against perpetuities applies to non-vested interests, which are void if
182. See, e.g., Melton, 109 P.2d at 512-13 (noting the impact of the presence of a lease on the
construction of royalties).
183. Barker, 507 S.W.2d at 618.
184. 823 N.W.2d 754 (N.D. 2012).
185. Id at 756 (noting that the deeds "were preprinted 'Mineral Deed' forms but stated ... that
they conveyed undivided fractional 'Royalty' interests" and that similar deeds executed by the
grantor Hamilton were found to be ambiguous in Williams Co. v. Hamilton) (citing Williams Co. v.
Hamilton, 427 N.W.2d 822, 824 (N.D. 1988)).
186. Id. at 757 (citing Melton, 109 P.2d at 513).
187. See, e.g., Ray v. Luce, No. EQ 1989-15, 1990 WL 305162, at *584-85 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.
Sept. 12, 1990) (relying on "sticks" in the bundle for resolving mineral or royalty issue).
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they fail to vest beyond the time frame allowed by the rule.'88 Most
states view the grant or reservation of a royalty interest (or nonparticipating royalty interest) as creating a vested property interest,
whether or not the interest-owner ever receives royalty payments,
thereby escaping the rule against perpetuities' application.18 9
Kansas, however, has adopted a different view.'90 In Cosgrove v.
Young, the court viewed the vesting event for non-participating royalty
interests as the time in the future when oil and gas royalties become
payable under an oil and gas lease.' 9' Because it is possible that leases
might not ever be executed, "there would never be a vesting of title to
any royalty interest."' 92 Cosgrove was decided in 1982 and relied on a
1951 decision, Lathrop v. Eyestone. 9 3 In addressing calls to overrule
Lathrop, the Cosgrove court responded, "[w]e are not unmindful that
some other jurisdictions might well reach a different result" regarding the
rule against perpetuities' application to non-participating royalty
interests.194 However, the court refused to retreat from Lathrop,
concluding "we see no compelling reason for change."' 95
Several writers, including a strong dissenting opinion in Cosgrove,
have asserted compelling reasons for change, such as a treatise's
188. Gray's classic definition of the rule against perpetuities is, "[n]o interest is good unless it
must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest." JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (Roland Gray ed., 4th ed.
1942).
189. See Burney, A PragmaticApproach, supra note 14, at 46 (citing Hanson v. Ware, 274
S.W.2d 359 (Ark. 1955); Gulf Refining Co. v. Stanford, 30 So.2d 516 (Miss. 1947); Schlittler v.
Smith, 101 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1937) (noting most jurisdictions have viewed nonparticipating royalty interest's as a vested interest). Other oil-patch interests raise rule against
perpetuities issues, but courts generally avoid voiding the interest. Id (discussing courts' creative
approaches to avoid voiding reserved term interests). A poorly drafted document, however, could
fall prey to the rule against perpetuities' effects. See Peveto v. Starkey, 645 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex.
1982) (finding that a top deed worded to postpone vesting until termination of bottom lease violated
rule against perpetuities).
190. Unlike other states, Kansas views an non-participating royalty interest as personal property
rather than real property. See Shepard v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 368 P.2d 19, 23-24
(Kan. 1962) (stating that as a right to share in production, royalties are personal property while
mineral interests refer to an interest in resources "in and under the land" and are therefore interests in
real property). However, the Kansas decisions regarding whether non-participating royalty interests
violate rule against perpetuities do not focus on that distinction.

191.

642 P.2d 75, 84 (Kan. 1982).

192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id. at 78-83 (citing Lathrop v. Eyestone, 227 P.2d 136 (Kan. 1951)).
Cosgrove v. Young, 642 P.2d. 75, 84 (Kan. 1982).
Id.
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prediction that the Kansas view would lead to an inefficient "division of
minerals into small shares held in common."l 9 6 That prediction
recognizes that courts faced with the mineral or royalty issue stretch for a
mineral determination in order to avoid the rule against perpetuities'
application.197 One example is Shepard v. John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Co., noted above for embracing the estate misconception in
resolving the conflicting fractions issue.19 8 That case also considered
whether the deed created a non-participating royalty rather than a mineral
interest.'9 9 The district court had agreed with the royalty determination
for some of the interests, and invalidated them under the rule against
200
perpetuities.
The Kansas Supreme Court, however, found it "unnecessary that we
pass upon that question," because it viewed the disputed interest as a
mineral interest.20' In reaching its conclusion, the court invoked the
estate misconception, a "redundancy analysis" reminiscent of the French
opinion, and discounted the royalty label in deference to a recital in a
mortgage and "some sixty other words."2 02 With a nod to the rule against
perpetuities' destructive effect, the court held that the "defendant
reserved an estate in real property which was vested in it upon delivery
of the deed. To hold otherwise would result in the destruction rather than
the construction of the property interest intended to be reserved." 20 3
In Drach v. Ely, a case decided twenty years after Shepard, the
196. Id. at 89 (Herd, J., dissenting) (pointing out the inconsistencies between the Lathrop rule
and the treatment of other interests comparable to royalties) (quoting 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra
note 103, at §324.4); see also Burney, A PragmaticApproach, supranote 14, at 47 (emphasizing the
dissent's policy arguments).
197. See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 8-11, Rucker v. Delay, 289 P.3d 1166 (Kan. 2012) (No.
101,766), 2011 WL 3575902, at *8-11 (noting that if the interest is a mineral interest it avoids the
question of the rule against perpetuities altogether); see also David E. Pierce, Recent Developments
in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law: Beyond Theories and Rules to the Motivating Jurisprudence,58
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 1, 3 (2007) (arguing that stretching interpretations to find mineral
interests to avoid the rule against perpetuities is a bad precedent to set).
198. 368 P.2d 19, 22-27 (Kan. 1962) (overturning the district court's decision that the deed
conveyed a royalty that violated the rule against perpetuities and instead held that a mineral interest
was reserved).
199. Id. at 24-27.
200. Id. at 22.
201. Id.at22,26.
202. Id. at 23-27. "Hence, had the parties intended the defendant to reserve only a royalty
interest there would have been no necessity to make the reservation nonparticipating as to bonuses
and delayed rentals since the plaintiffs would have been entitled to them as owners of the surface
and of all the minerals in place in fee." Id. at 25.
203. Id. at 26.
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Kansas Supreme Court again avoided the rule against perpetuities by
interpreting a grant as creating a non-participating mineral interest.204 i
reviewing the court's analysis, one commentator criticized the court for
not having adopted a "more forthright" approach:
Ironically, the grantor's express retention of these elements of a mineral
interest helped to establish, in the court's view, that the conveyed
interests were mineral interests and not royalty interests. The court
concluded that the conveyance was of undivided shares of the mineral
estate, nonparticipating in rentals and bonuses. Consequently, the
conveyance did not violate the rule against perpetuities, as it would
have if the court had construed it to be the conveyance of royalty
interests. This result was prompted, in part, by the general view that
courts should favor a construction that complies with the rule against
perpetuities over one that violates the rule. A more forthright approach
would have been to overrule the Kansas view that perpetual
nonparticipating royalty interests violate the rule against perpetuities.
Kansasj alone in holding this view, which is unsupported by logic or
policy.
a.

Rucker v. DeLay: A Partial Retreat from the Rule Against
Perpetuities Precedent

The current oil and gas production boom provided the Kansas
Supreme Court with another opportunity to overrule the Kansas view.
Rucker v. DeLay, decided in 2012, involved a dispute over a reservation
in a 1924 deed from landowners who sold their surface and minerals
estate in Barber County, 20 6 where "the future of the Kansas gas and oil
industry is happening now., 207 The trial court had held that the reserved
interest created a non-participating royalty interest.208 The appellate
court agreed and "reluctantly" ruled the reserved interest was therefore

204. Drach v. Ely, 703 P.2d 746, 751 (Kan. 1985).
205. Phillip E. DeLaTorre, Recent Developments in Kansas Oil and Gas Law (1983-1988), 37
U. KAN. L. REV. 907, 925-26 (1989) (citations omitted). I have urged couits to adopt a more
forthright or pragmatic approach to the application of the rule against perpetuities to oil patch
interests. See Burney, A PragmaticApproach, supra note 14, at 45 (criticizing courts for creatively
avoiding the rule against perpetuities' effects rather than openly exempting them from the rule).
206. 289 P.3d 1166, 1168 (Kan. 2012).
207. See Gale Rose, Gov. Brownback Sees Current Oil and Gas Techniques During Barber
County
Visit,
PRATr
TRIBUNE
(Sept.
28,
2011,
11:37
AM),
http://www.pratttribune.com/article/20110928/NEWS/309289932 (proclaiming that, "[t]he future of
the Kansas gas and oil industry is happening now in Barber County").
208. Rucker v. DeLay, 289 P.3d 1166, 1168 (Kan. 2012).
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void under Kansas rule against perpetuities precedent.209
In reaching its decision in Rucker, the Kansas Supreme Court
acknowledged calls to overrule Cosgrove and Lathrop.210 For example,
Professor David Pierce filed a persuasive amicus curiae brief, in which
he acknowledged that in order to preserve the stability of land titles,
courts should not rush to overrule rules of property. 2 1' However, because
the Kansas view encouraged creative interpretations to avoid the
unintended destruction of interests, he urged the court to correct the
Cosgrove and Lathrop views on the rule against perpetuities' application
to non-participating royalty interests.212
In the end, Rucker only partially heeded calls to "right the ship"
regarding the rule against perpetuities and non-participating royalty
interests. While the court recognized the errors of viewing production as
the "vesting" event for non-participating royalty interests, it declined to
"overrule our caselaw holding royalty interests created in a transferee are
future interests that vest at production because that issue is not squarely
before us,, 2 13 Instead, the court held that the reserved royalty interest in
the 1924 deed was vested, and therefore not subject to the rule against
214
perpetuities.
In addition to an over-zealous exercise of judicial restraint, the
court's decision turned on a flawed analysis of the common law rule.
The court begins by noting that as it developed at common law, the rule
against perpetuities applies to certain future interests. 2 15 By definition, a
209. Id. at 1169. The reserved language provided: "The grantor herein reserves 60% of the land
owner's one-eighth interest to the oil, gas or other minerals that may hereafter be developed under
any oil and gas lease made by the grantee or by his subsequent grantees." Id. at 1168.
210. Id. at 1172.
211. Brief of Amicus Curiae supranote 197, at *7.
212. Id. at *8 (urging the court to take "necessary action to remedy the situation so Kansas
district courts are not forced to address the issue on a case-by-case basis through reformation" under
state statute).
213. Rucker, 289P.3dat 1173.
214. See id at 1172-73 (noting the criticism of the Kansas approach in that the rule against
perpetuities does not apply to vested interests and subsequently not applying the rule against
perpetuities to this reservation). The court also noted that Kansas had adopted the Uniform Rule
Against Perpetuities, which supersedes the common law rule; however, it applies only to interests
created after 1992. Id. at 1170. Professor Pierce, however, argued in his brief, that the statute had
broader application. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supranote 197, at *8.
215. See Rucker, 289 P.3d at 1170 ("The common-law rule against perpetuities 'precludes the
creation of any future interest in property which does not necessarily vest within twenty-one [21]
years after a life or lives presently in being....') (quoting Singer Co. v. Makad, Inc., 518 P.2d 493,
496 (Kan. 1974)).

2013]

OIL, GAS, AND MINERAL TITLES

135

"future interest" is a presently owned non-possessory interest, which may
become possessory in the future.2 16 According to the common law
development of the rule, however, the rule against perpetuities applies
only to certain future interests, contingent remainders and executory
interests.2 17 The rule does not apply to other vested future interests.218 A
classic example is the reversion retained by a grantor, who, owning an
estate in fee simple, conveys only a life estate. Because he conveyed less
than the fee simple estate he owned, the grantor has retained a reversion,
a vested interest, exempt from the rule against perpetuities'
application. 21 9 The future interest label applies, not because the interest
is not a presently-owned and vested interest, but because it will not
become possessory until the future. Other future interests exempt from
the rule against perpetuities' application include the possibility of
reverter retained by the grantor of a fee simple determinable estate.220 In
many jurisdictions, the oil and gas lease creates a fee simple
determinable in the lessee, leaving the possibility of reverter in the
lessor.2 2 1 The lessor's interest is a vested future interest, an interest that
becomes possessory only upon termination of the lease.222

216.

See CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN & SHELDON F. KURTZ, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF

REAL PROPERTY 125 (3d ed. 2002) ("[Future] interests have a present existence even though
enjoyment of possession is postponed.").
217. Id. at 244. For a discussion of the application of the rule against perpetuities to other oilpatch interests, top leases and deeds, and reserved term interests, see generally Burney, A Pragmatic
Approach, supra note 14, at 40-54 (outlining the history of the rule against perpetuities in the oil
patch).
218. The rule against perpetuities applies to contingent remainders and executory interests, but
the rule will not void those interests if they vest, if at all, within 21 years from lives in being at the
creation of the interest, which is Gray's classic recitation of the rule against perpetuities. See
MOYNIHAN & KURTZ, supra note 216, at 243 (espousing Gray's classic recitation of the rule against
perpetuities).
219. When the life estate ends, the grantor assumes the right to possession, and his fee simple
interest is complete. See id. at 126-28 (summarizing the common law concept of reversions).
220. 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL & GAS § 3.9(E), at 378 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER] (noting that the
possibility of reverter does not violate the rule against perpetuities).
221. The classic phrase creating a fee simple determinable is "so long as." See MOYNIHAN &
KURTZ, supra note 216, at 44 ("Typically, the fee simple determinable arises through the use of
the ... phrase[] 'so long as . . . .'). Because that phrase appears in common oil and gas lease forms,
early courts classified the lessee's interest as a fee simple determinable, which is also a vested
interest exempt from the rule. See generally Burney, A Pragmatic Approach, supra note 14, at 4054 (citing early cases and decisions regarding the rule against perpetuities).
222. See 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, supranote 220, at 3-78 ("[A]
lessor ... retains a vested possibility of reverter .... ).
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In sum, vested future interests, whether created by grant or
reservation, are exempt from the rule against perpetuities' application, a
fact the Rucker opinion notes.223 Yet in the end the court retreated from
the general vested category, and restricted its ruling to the exemption
accorded to reversions, the interests retained by grantors.224 Because the
interest at issue was reserved by the grantor, the court overruled
Cosgrove and Lathrop only as to reserved interests. 22 5 The court's
narrow holding guarantees more shale era disputes in Kansas over
interests that may or may not be interpreted as non-participating royalty
interests. When presented with another chance to "right the ship,"226
which the court purported to do in Rucker, the Kansas Supreme Court
should complete the process and view non-participating royalty interests
as vested interests, whether created by grant or reservation, which are
exempt from the rule against perpetuities' application. That view reflects
common law precedent and the view of writers who uniformly argue that
the rule against perpetuities has no business in the oil patch.227
IV. THE MEANING OF "MINERALS": DOES IT INCLUDE OIL AND GAS?
A. The PennsylvaniaProblem: The Dunham Rule
While Kansas courts grappled with applying the decades-old rule
against perpetuities precedent to non-participating royalty interests in the
shale era, Pennsylvania courts recently faced an 1882 case when
examining the meaning of "minerals." In most jurisdictions, the term
"minerals" includes oil and gas.228 Pennsylvania, however, formulated a
223. See Rucker, 289 P.3d at 1171 (reciting Gray's classic recitation of the rule).
224. See id. at 1173 (declining "to extend the [court's prior vesting analysis] to royalty interests
reserved in the grantor").
225. See id. ("[W]e need not determine in this case whether we should overrule our caselaw
holding royalty interests created in a transferee are future interests that vest at production . . .
226. Id.
227. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 197, at 7 (arguing that applying the rule
against perpetuities to the defendants' oil and gas lease would be an unnecessary expansion of the
rule). See generally Burney, A Pragmatic Approach, supra note 14, at 40-54 (describing the
applicability of the rule against perpetuities to oil and gas leases in different jurisdictions). Note that
a Uniform Rule should help. See id. (describing the problems with piecemeal exceptions to the rule
against perpetuities that could be remedied by adopting a uniform exception to the rule against
perpetuities for oil and gas leases).
228. See McCormick v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 14 P.3d 346, 349-51 (Colo. 2000) (adopting the
majority position and reviewing views taken by other courts, noting that "only a few jurisdictions in
the eastern United States take the position that oil and gas are not included within the term

2013]

OIL, GAS, AND MINERAL TITLES

137

different rule in Dunham v. Kirkpatrick.22 9 The Dunham rule has been
recognized to allow a rebuttable presumption "if, in connection with a
conveyance of land, there is a reservation or an exception of 'minerals'
without any specific mention of natural gas or oil,... the word
'minerals' was not intended by the parties to include natural gas or
oil." 2 30 Addressing the Dunham rule in a 1960 case, Highland v.
Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to depart from
this "rule of property":
The [Dunham Rule] has been the law of [Pennsylvania] for [many
years] and very many titles to land rest upon it. It has become a rule of
property and it will not be disturbed.... [T]hat the word 'minerals'
appears in a gppt, rather than an exception or a reservation, in nowise
alters the rule.
Predictably, property owners questioned the Dunham rule in a
dispute over Marcellus shale gas. Butler v. Charles Powers Estate
involved the interpretation of a reservation in an 1881 deed of "minerals
and Petroleum Oils." 232 The trial court had applied the Dunham rule and

'minerals'); HEMINGWAY, supra note 155, at 8 ("[A] majority of states have concluded that the
term 'minerals' includes oil and gas . . . .").
229. See Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 40 (1882) ("[T]he words 'all minerals,' used in the
exception and reservation in the article of agreement and the deed mentioned in the case stated, do
not, in common and ordinary meaning, include petroleum.").
230. Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, 65 A.3d 885, 888 (Pa. 2013) (quoting Highland v.
Commonwealth, 161 A.2d 390, 398-99 (Pa. 1960)).
231. Highland, 161 A.2d at 398-99 (quoting Preston v. S. Penn Oil Co., 86 A. 203, 204 (Pa.
1913)). A vigorous dissent in Highlandnoted that:
In order to arrive at the conclusion reached by the Majority, one must find that
practically everyone involved in writing conveyances, drafting Court orders, preparing
documents and presenting exhibits desired to mock the English language, make sport of
rules of grammar, distort the meaning of the simplest words, and ignore the sequence of
cause and effect. . . .
We must do all these things, which deride the purpose of language, are cynical of the
dictionary, do violence to logic, upset Court decisions, and, worst of all, establish a
precedent which will puzzle the learned, confuse the unlearned, and introduce into the
law of real estate a quality of instability as fugacious as the natural gas which is the
subject of this lawsuit.
Id at 409 (Musmanno, J., dissenting). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also addressed the
Dunham rule in a 1906 opinion, Silver v. Bush. 62 A. 832 (Pa. 1906) (affirming Dunham in that the
reservation of "minerals" did not include petroleum and, therefore, also did not include natural gas).
232. Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, 29 A.3d 35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).
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held this phrase did not include Marcellus gas.233 In remanding this
ruling, the superior court sanctioned introduction of scientific and
historic evidence about the Marcellus shale and the natural gas contained
therein.234 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to determine
"whether the Superior Court erred in remanding the case" to trial. 2 35 As
described below, on April 24, 2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decided the superior court had erred and reinstated the trial court's
ruling.
1. The "Public Reliance" Factor
The Butler case had garnered attention among lawyers and
laypeople, many reiterating the concern voiced in the Highlandopinion:
If the Supreme Court were to revisit the Dunham Rule and modify it in
any meaningful way, it would have the potential to cause significant
chaos in the oil and gas industry in Pennsylvania.... People in
Pennsylvania hlye understood that this is the way you wrote deeds
since the 1880s.
2. Did Dunham Create a "Rule of Property" or a "Rule of
Construction?"-Does it Matter?
The views expressed above suggest that Pennsylvania courts and
residents have viewed the Dunham rule as a rule of property. As
Professor Pierce noted in his amicus curiae brief in Rucker, courts should
The
exercise restraint before overruling a rule of property.237
justification for preserving such rules-as reflected in the concern about
233. See id at 42-43 (noting that the trial court held that, according to Dunham, "a reservation
in a deed of 'all minerals' did not include petroleum oil").
234. Id at 43.
235. Order Granting Petition for Allowance of Appeal, 41 A.3d 854 (Pa. 2012) (per curiam).
236. Sophia Pearson & Mike Lee, PennsylvaniaHigh Court Takes Appeal on Marcellus Shale
Rights, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-0405/pennsylvania-high-court-takes-appeal-on-Marcellus-Shale-rights; see also Dale A. Tice, Opening
Pandora's Box? Calling Shale Gas Rights into Question, 34 PA. LAW. 24 (Mar./Apr. 2012)
("Uncertainty is exactly what oil and gas lawyers in Pennsylvania are living with now following the
Superior Court decision in Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, 29 A.3d 35 (Pa. Super., Sept. 7,
2011).").
237. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 197, at *7 ("Rules of Property, Even 'Bad' Ones,
Should Rarely Be Changed."). Regarding the rule against perpetuities' application to nonparticipating royalty interests, Professor Pierce argued that the Kansas courts had incorrectly applied
the "rule of property." Id at *4-5.
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creating "chaos" in the quote above-is the need for certainty in drafting
and interpreting titles. 238 In light of the deference accorded to rules of
property, courts in general should consider whether rules affecting
mineral titles fall in that category.
Historically, courts have differentiated between rules of property and
rules of construction. "Rules of property" apply to set terms or words as
a matter of law, regardless of the intent of the parties; a "rule of
construction", on the other hand, applies only as an interpretative aid for
ascertaining the intent of the parties.239 Rules of property contribute to
title stability because title examiners can confidently determine property
rights from the four-corners of documents. Rules of construction, by
contrast, permit fact-finding determinations before meaning can be
applied to the same terms appearing in different documents. 2 40 However,
such case-by-case determinations create uncertainty for drafters and title
examiners.
The rule against perpetuities discussed in the previous section
provides a classic common law example of a rule of property. The rule
against perpetuities applies to certain interests, possibly leading to their
238. See, e.g., Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, at 103 (Tex. 1984) (declining to
overrule retroactively the "surface destruction" test for interpreting the phrase "other minerals" in
light of public reliance on prior law); see also United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472,
486-87 (1924) ("'Where questions arise which affect titles to land, it is of great importance to the
public that, when they are once decided, they should no longer be considered open. Such decisions
become rules of property, and many titles may be injuriously affected by their change."' (quoting
Minn. Mining Co. v. Nat'l Mining Co., 70 U.S. 332, 334 (1865))). See generally Laura H. Burney,
"Oil, Gas, and Other Minerals" Clauses in Texas: Who's On First?, 41 Sw. L.J. 695, 714 (1987)
(discussing protection accorded to rules of property to protect property rights) [hereinafter Burney,
Who's On First]. For a general discussion of the difference between a "rule of property" and a "rule
of construction" see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP.: FUTURE INTERESTS pt. III intro. note (1940)
(noting that rules of property and rules of construction are distinct, but nevertheless "have certain
points of contact and similarity").
239. See MOYNIHAN & KuRTZ, supra note 216, at 183 (noting that the Rule in Shelley's Case
was held "in accordance with the English view, [to be] a positive rule of law, not a rule of
construction, that is, that its operation did not depend on the intention of the conveyor or testator but
would apply, if its requirements were satisfied, regardless of the transferor's intention").
240. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 11.2 (2003) (outlining when extrinsic evidence can be used along with rules of construction to
determine intent). Another common law rule, the Doctrine of Worthier Title, was effectively
converted from a rule of property to a rule of construction in a famous opinion written by Justice
Cardozo in Doctor v. Hughes. 122 N.E. 221, 222 (N.Y. 1919) (noting that originally, the Doctrine of
Worthier Title "was a rule, not of construction, but of property"). "The importance of the court and
the eminence of the judge who wrote the opinion gave the rule a prominence it had previously
lacked and changing the rule from a positive rule of law to one of construction appeared to have the
merit of effectuating the intention of the grantor." MOYNIHAN & KURTZ, supra note 216, at 197.

140

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

invalidation, even if its application frustrates the intent of the parties.24'
Indeed, this intent frustrating feature fuels calls to reject certain rules of
property.242 When courts or legislatures take this step, however, they
generally overrule them prospectively rather than retroactively. The
justification for a "prospective only" approach is the public's reliance on
rules and their effects on drafting and interpreting documents.24 3
Although the Dunham rule has been viewed as a rule of property, the
courts' descriptions reflect a rule of construction by permitting
consideration of parties' intent. The Dunham opinion states that the
word "minerals" creates not a set meaning as a matter of law but "a
rebuttable presumption that the grantor did not intend for 'minerals' to
include natural gas or oil." 244 Highland's reiteration of the rule in 1960
expressly refers to it as both a rule of property and a rule of construction:
"In [Dunham] this Court enunciated a rule of construction of the word
'minerals' to be applied when determining the inclusion therein or the
241. As noted in the previous section, in light of the rule against perpetuities' blanket
application to certain non-vested interests, courts have avoided its application to non-participating
royalty interests by viewing them as vested interests. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying
text.
242. A classic example from common law is the "Rule in Shelley's Case." That rule provides
that if a grant is made to a life tenant followed by a remainder in that life tenant's heirs, the
remainder is rewritten to create a vested remainder in the life tenant. The point of the rule was to
allow merger to occur, leaving the life tenant with a fee simple absolute. Common law courts
designed the rule to apply regardless of the parties' intent to promote feudal policies that preferred
fee simple estates. When that rule crossed the Atlantic, states struggled with whether to overrule this
"rule of property," expressing concern that parties had relied on its ultimate effect. Many courts
reluctantly applied Shelley's Rule when raised by the words in conveyances, and awaited legislative
action to overrule it. See MOYNIHAN & KURTZ, supra note 216, at 181-91 (outlining the
development and operation of the rule).
243. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §5.042 (West 2012) (abolishing the Rule in Shelley's
Case and stating that conveyances that took effect twenty years before the statute's enactment will
not be affected); Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 103 (overruling the "surface destruction test" prospectively
only in light of public's reliance); see also Bumey, Who's On First, supra note 238, at 712-15
(citing Great N.Y. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 365 (1932)) (opining that courts should
consider whether ruling affects title stability when deciding whether to overrule prospectively or
retroactively). In that article I argued that the Texas Supreme Court should have retroactively
overruled the "surface destruction test" for determining whether the phrase "other minerals"
included uranium because that test required factual inquiries; therefore, parties could not have relied
on it as a matter of law. Id. at 696. The Dunham definition, however, arguably established a set,
even if misguided, definition of the word "minerals."
244. Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, 29 A.3d 35, 40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011), rev'd sub nom
Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, 65 A.3d 885 (Pa. 2013) (citing Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36,
42 (1882) (doubting that the term mineral includes petroleum and stating that where a term's
meaning is doubtful, it must be construed against the grantor).
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exclusion therefrom of natural gas or oil. This decision established a rule
of property ... .245 Yet Highlandcontinues to describe not a set rule but
a presumption rebuttable by "clear and convincing evidence that the
parties to the conveyance intended to include natural gas or oil within
such word."24 6
In Butler, the trial court adopted the rule of property view of
Dunham.24 7 In appealing that ruling, the owners of the reserved
"minerals" interest argued the trial court erred under that categorization
of the rule.248 First, they argued the Dunham rule, excluding gas from
the word "minerals," should not apply to the Butler deed since it predates the Dunham opinion by a year.249 In light of that chronology, the
argument that drafters relied on Dunham's definition as a rule of
Second, the "minerals" owners
property could lose force. 25 0
distinguished Dunham, arguing it involved conventional rather than shale
gas, "and no Pennsylvania decision has decided that mineral rights
exclude Marcellus shale."25' In remanding, the superior court focused on
that second point:
The Dunham and Highlanddecisions do not end the analysis, absent a
more sufficient understanding of whether, inter alia (1) Marcellus shale
constitutes a 'mineral'; (2) Marcellus shale gas constitutes the type of
conventional natural gas contemplated in Dunham and Highland; and
(3) Marcellus shale is similar to coal to the extent that whoever owns

245. Highland v. Commonwealth, 161 A.2d 390, 398 (Pa. 1960).
246. Id. at 399.
247. See Butler, 29 A.3d at 37 (noting that the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's "request for a
declaratory judgment that natural gas is included in the reservation of the deed").
248. See id. at 38 (noting that the only issue raised on appeal was "whether .. . [the trial court]
erred in determining that the . . . reservation in the chain of title to the surface land currently owned
by ... appellees did not include a reservation of one half of such unconventional Marcellus shale gas
as might be found under the land").
249. Reply Brief of Appellants, at *3-4, Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, 29 A.3d 35 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2011) (No. 1795 MDA 2010), 2011 WL 3342735. In fact, the owners of the reserved "minerals"
argue that prior to Dunham the word included natural gas. Id They also note that the Highland
deeds were executed after the Dunham decision; therefore, neither case is controlling. Id. at *5.
250. See id. at *3 ("The significance of this sequence is that, as of the date of the deed and the
subject reservation, the Dunham decision was totally unknown to the scrivener who wrote the
subject reservation. Had the scrivener been a close and diligent student of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, he or she could never have imagined that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
create such a glaring departure from so many years of contract and deed construction.").
251. Butler, 29 A.3d at 39.
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the shale, owns the shale gas.252
3.

Butler v. CharlesPowers Estate: Reaffirming Dunham for the Shale

Era
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to review the superior
court's Butler ruling on April 3, 2012.253 A year later, the supreme court
reinstated the trial court's ruling, determining that "the Dunham Rule has
now been an unaltered, unwavering rule of property law for 131 years;
indeed its origins actually date back to the [1836] Gibson decision,
placing the rule's age at 177 years."254 Having clarified that the Dunham
rule predated the 1882 Dunham decision, the court rejected the claim that
the rule should not apply to the 1881 deed in Butler.25 5 Additionally,
while the court repeatedly applied the rule of property moniker, it
continued to recognize that the Dunham rule permits consideration of
parol evidence of the parties' intent when executing the deed.256
As explained above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's definition of
Dunham reflects a rule of construction, which opens the door to case-bycase decisions that detract from title stability. 257 A concurring justice
recognized this distinction. Although that justice viewed Dunham as
"cryptic, conclusory, and highly debatable,"258 Justice Saylor focused on
the extent of public reliance and would have clarified its "rule of
property" status: "In this regard, on account of Dunham's shortcomings,
I find the 'rule of property law' denominator more accurate than a
characterization of Dunham as a sustainable effort to assess the actual
intentions of the parties to a conveyance."259
The concurring justice also appeared to note another option,

252. Id. at 43. The "minerals" owners relied on Us. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa.
1983), which held that coalbed methane gas belongs to the owner of the coal. Id. Similarly, the
"minerals" owners in Butler claimed that the owners of the shale owned the shale gas. Id.
253. Order Granting Petition for Allowance of Appeal, supra note 235.
254. Butler, 65 A.3d at 897. The Gibson case to which the court refers was decided in 1836.
255. See id. at 898 ("[In 1881, the law of Pennsylvania was Gibson .... ).
256. See id. ("[T]he rule in Pennsylvania is that natural gas and oil simply are not minerals ....
[The intention to include natural gas within the deed reservation] may only be shown through parol
evidence....").
257. See supra Part H.C.1.
258. Id. at 899 (Saylor, J., concurring).
259.

Idat900n.l.
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discussed above,260 for replacing cryptic rules with those that promote
title stability: ruling prospectively only from the date of the opinion.2 61
Indeed, the Butler dispute presented the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
with the opportunity to change the law prospectively and adopt an
expansive definition of the term "minerals," one that includes oil, and
gas, including Marcellus gas.262 A broad definition of minerals, as
scholars and courts have explained, decreases litigation and increases

260. See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text (arguing that the historical understanding
of "rules of property" should be given great deference because many people relied on that
understanding of the rules).
261. See id. at 900 (noting that in light of the public reliance on Dunham, the court could not
overrule it retroactively). Rules and statutes that affect titles are often restricted by dates. See, e.g.,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-1-111 (1993) (defining "coal," "gas," and "oil," prospectively from 1993);
Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 103 (limiting ruling prospectively to deeds executed after date of opinion).
Arkansas followed a trek similar to Pennsylvania's with the Strohacker doctrine, which limited the
meaning of conveyances of "valuable mineral deposits" to minerals "known to be valuable at the
time of the grant." Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Strohacker, 152 S.W.2d 557, 563 (Ark. 1941) (holding that
the reservation of "all coal and mineral deposits" in 1892 was ineffective to reserve oil and gas). A
recent Arkansas Supreme Court case, however, narrowed that doctrine and adopted a date-specific
approach for the meaning of "minerals." See Staggs v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 11-902, 2012 WL
1222225, at *5 (Ark. Apr. 12, 2012) (noting that "between 1905 and 1937, it became common
knowledge in Arkansas that a reservation of mineral rights included oil and gas"); see also Jamie G.
Moss, Comment, The Strohacker Doctrine:Its Application in Arkansas Courts and the Needfor an
UpdatedRule, 64 ARK. L. REv. 1095, 1118-19 (2011) (urging courts to adopt a date-specific "bright
line" rule to ensure title stability and encourage leasing in the current shale boom).
262. Writers support an expansive definition of the term "minerals" or "other minerals." See,
e.g., Eugene 0. Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 WYO. L.J. 107, 112-13
(1948), reprinted in 34 OKLA. L. REv. 28, 34-35 (1981) ("Since the enjoyment of oil and gas is
through extraction, it should be considered to be within a general grant or reservation of the
minerals."). Interpreting "minerals" and "gas" as broadly as possible would also promote title
stability. See Spurlock v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 694 P.2d 299, 307 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) ("To
alleviate these problems, many courts find the term minerals to be unambiguous. Under this
approach title uncertainty is minimized and courts are able to avoid the tortuous process of
attempting to discover the parties' specific intent."); see also KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
OIL AND GAS, supra note 13, at 384 (promoting the idea that when there is a general severance the
entire estate should be severed to promote stability); LOWE, supra note 13, at 496 (preferring an
expansive definition of "other minerals" because it avoids case-by-case searches for the parties'
intent). Idaho recently had the chance to do just this and instead found the term "minerals"
ambiguous instead of excluding geothermal resources from the definition. See Ida-Therm, LLC v.
Bedrock Geothermal, LLC, 293 P.3d 630, 633-36 (Idaho 2012). On the contrary, a recent West
Virginia opinion stressed the need to promote title stability in overruling a 1923 case that had
required viewing the word "surface" as ambiguous, and instead adopted a broad definition of that
term. Faith United Methodist Church & Cemetery of Terra Alta v. Morgan, 745 S.E.2d 461, 464
(W. Va. 2013) (overruling Ramage v. S. Penn Oil Co., 118 S.E. 162 (W. Va. 1923)).
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title stability, which should be the guiding goal in the shale era.263
However, the concurring justice viewed that approach as unnecessary for
this reason: the effects of the Dunham decision can easily be avoided
with careful drafting. 26 In fact, drafters can and have avoided Dunham's
dictates by expressly mentioning oil and gas. For example, in a recent
Marcellus shale case, Kowcheck v. Pittsburgh Terminal Realization
Corp., the court held that Dunham was irrelevant to the interpretation of
a 1946 deed that reserved "all oil and gas under said tracts of land
together with the right and privilege of drilling and removing said oil and
gas

. . .. "265

Rather than alter Dunham prospectively, the Pennsylvania Supreme

263. In a different context the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted "minerals" more
broadly. See Joseph Jole, May Two Laws Occupy the Same Space at the Same Time? Understanding
PennsylvaniaPreemption Law in the Marcellus Shale Context, 6 APPALACHIAN NAT. RES. L.J. 39,
42 (2011-2012). lole notes that:
Because the debates are so nuanced, some contests among the ever-changing cast of
characters (each somehow involved in or affected by gas extraction from the Marcellus
shale) have led to peculiar results. For example, one contest involves the interpretation of
"mineral extraction." In Huntley & Huntley v. Borough Council of Oakmont [sic], the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the Commonwealth Court's finding that natural gas
drilling falls within the category of "mineral extraction," leading to the determination that
the Borough had to grant a special use permit for the drilling activity. Counterintuitively, when determining property rights from certain mineral leases, "minerals"
could take on a nuanced definition that does not include natural gas. This assault on
logical consistency, which is generally a by-product of the legal objective to determine
the drafter's intent, could also illustrate that not all contests in the "oil and gas
development" have the same stakes involved. Whether debating property rights or
intrastate preemption, it is important to identify the interested parties.
Id at 42-43.
264. See Butler, 65 A.3d at 900 (Saylor, J., concurring) ("Finally, I note that, in terms of modem
conveyances, the parties certainly have the ability to negate the impact of the Dunham decision by
making their intentions clear on the face of the written instrumentation. This lessens the need for
this Court to consider fashioning a new, prospective rule.").
265. See Kowcheck v. Pittsburgh Terminal Realization Corp., No. 2009-4328, 2011 WL
9753960, at *3 (Pa. Com. Pl. Civil Div. Nov. 14, 2011) (noting that, unlike the deed at issue in
Dunham, the deed in the instant case does not require interpretation of the term "all minerals"). This
opinion relies on a 1996 Pennsylvania Supreme Court case that had analyzed a deed that expressly
referred to oil and gas. Id (citing Sheaffer v. Caruso, 676 A.2d 204 (Pa. 1996)). In Kowcheck, the
plaintiffs had argued that "gas" did not include Marcellus shale gas since that gas would have been
unknown to the parties when the deed was executed. Id. The court rejected that view. See id.
("Here, the reservation language in the 1946 deed specifically reserves 'all oil and gas under said
tracts of land'. Thus, there is no issue as to whether the gas rights were excepted and reserved by the
deed.").
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Court in Butler retained and reaffirmed the Dunham rule.266 In the
process, the court repeated rule of construction verbiage. However, its
restrictive approach permits rule of property effects. Specifically, the
court emphasized that overcoming the Dunham presumption requires
"clear and convincing" evidence of the parties' intent, and not other
evidence at the time the deed was executed-a difficult burden for
parties to meet.26 7 Another recent Marcellus shale dispute from
Pennsylvania illustrates not only the difficulty of this burden but courts'
preference to avoid fact-based inquiries about intent. In Elbow Fish &
Game Club, Inc. v. Guillaume Business Opportunity Group, the court
rejected pleas to await the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling in
Butler.2 6 8 Instead, the court concluded that summary judgment was
proper when the parties admitted that "all parties to the 1928 transaction
have passed and that no direct evidence of the parties' intent exists."269
In its conclusion, the court reemphasized the significance of the Dunham
rule, and described it with rule of property parameters: "Many titles to
land within the Commonwealth rest upon the Dunham rule; this Court
will abide by this long-standing rule of property until otherwise advised
by our appellate courts."270 In light of the Butler decision, courts in
Pennsylvania have been advised that the Dunham rule reigns in that
state-whether viewed as a rule of property or rule of construction-for
drafting and resolving title disputes involving the meaning of "minerals"
in the shale era.
V. THE EXECUTIVE RIGHT AND CORRESPONDING DUTY: LESLEY V.
VETERANS LAND BOARD

As evidenced in the discussion of Butler, courts should consider
public reliance on prior law in rulings that affect property rights.

266. Butler, 65 A.3d at 899 (noting that the facts did not support deviating from the Dunham
analysis and affirming the lower court's decision under Dunham).
267. Id (holding that "under the Dunham Rule, the trial court correctly concluded on the
averments of record that Marcellus shale natural gas was not contemplated by the private deed
reservation presented in this case"). The court also rejected claims that its rulings regarding
ownership of coalbed methane gas, or that the methods of producing Marcellus shale natural gas,
required it to depart from Dunham. Id.
268. No. 12-00825, 2013 WL 1364007 (Pa. Com. PI. Mar. 25, 2013).
269. Id at *6.
270. Id.at*14-15.
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However, a recent Texas opinion, Lesley v. Veterans LandBoard,27 1 fails
to address that concern despite claims that it marked a turning point from
prior law.272 That prior law consists of cases defining the duty owed by
executives to non-executive owners. As with other perennial title issues
discussed above, most executive-duty law emanates from Texas cases.273
However, because these cases sent mixed messages, writers have
recognized lingering uncertainty and have urged courts to provide
clarification about the scope of the duty.274 Lesley, a shale era case,

271. 352 S.W.3d 479 (Tex. 2011). The author served as appellate counsel for the developer in
this case and argued on its behalf in the Texas Supreme Court.
272. See Christopher S. Kulander, The Executive Right to Lease MineralReal Property in Texas
Before and After Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 44 ST. MARY'S L.J. 529, 556 (2013) (noting
Lesley departed from prior law); see also J. Robert Beatty and Monika Ehrman, The Nature of the
Severed Executive Right, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS CLE 26 (2004) (noting before the Texas Supreme

Court revisited In re Bass in Lesley that "[u]nder current Texas law, an executive does not breach a
fiduciary duty to the non-executive if the executive does not exercise his right to execute an oil and
gas lease").
273. In other states, extensive compulsory pooling statutes render the executive duty less
significant. Texas's statute is not as comprehensive; therefore, in Texas, leases executed by
executive right owners, plus the pooling clauses in those leases are key for field-wide development.
See Laura H. Burney, The Texas Supreme Court and Oil and Gas Jurisprudence: What Hath
Wagner & Brown v. Sheppard Wrought?, 5 TEX. J. OF OIL, GAS, AND ENERGY L. 219, 225 (2010)

[hereinafter Burney, The Texas Supreme Court and Oil]. The Texas Supreme Court and Oil
provides:
Forming pooled units is essential in the oil and gas industry ....
For that reason,
most major producing states long ago passed compulsory pooling acts. Notoriously slow
to follow that path, Texas passed an act in 1965 known as the Mineral Interest Pooling
Act ('MIPA'). Unlike acts in other states, however, authorities view the MIPA as limited
in function, less a compulsory act than an act to encourage voluntary pooling. In fact, in
Texas pooled units formed pursuant to the MIPA are relatively rare.
Id. See generally 3 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS

§ 12.5

(2011) (noting the restricted nature of the Mineral Interest Pooling Act as compared to
compulsory pooling acts in other states). Additionally, statutes governing development on state and
federal lands generally preempt executive duty case law by mandating leasing practices and duties.
See, e.g., Patrick H. Martin, Unbundlingthe Executive Right: A Guide to Interpretationof the Power
to Lease and Develop Oil and Gas Interests, 37 NAT. RES. J. 311, 389 (1997) (describing that
separate from case law, "Texas has a unique arrangement for certain of its public lands that are the
subject of the Relinquishment Act"); see also State v. Durham, 860 S.W.2d 63, 66 (Tex. 1993)
(holding that under the Relinquishment Act, which names the surface owner an agent for the state in
leasing, the owner owes a fiduciary duty).
274. See Ernest E. Smith, Implications of a FiduciaryStandardof Conductfor the Holder of the
Executive Right, 64 TEX. L. REV. 371, 406 (1985) (concluding that even after Manges, "[i]t may not,
however, be too late to argue for a lesser standard than that of a fiduciary"); Norvell, supra note 104,
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provided the Texas Supreme Court with that opportunity.275
A. The Mixed Messages Regardingthe Duty: Fiduciaryor Utmost Good
Faith?
The Lesley opinion begins with the bundle of sticks analogy: "The
right to lease minerals-the executive right-is one 'stick' in the bundle
of five real property rights that comprise a mineral estate." 2 76
Concerning the corresponding duty, the court initially notes that it "held
long ago that the executive owes . . . a duty of 'utmost fair dealing,"' but

that it has "seldom had occasion to elaborate."2 77 However, in prior
cases, notably the notorious 1984 case Manges v. Guerra,2 7 8 the court
had elaborated by combining the fiduciary label with the lower standard,
"utmost good faith." 2 7 9 The court's use of that label has created
confusion and elicited criticism. Applied in its traditional sense, that
label suggests executives owe the high level of duty imposed in trust and
agency relationships. 2 80 That standard would require executives to
at 981 (noting the "uncertainty that lingers as to the Manges decision's effect on the standard of
care").
275. See Andarko Petroleum Corp. v. BNW Prop. Co., 393 S.W.3d 846, 850-52 (Tex. App.
2012) (noting that discovery of the Barnett shale prompted non-executives to sue executives in
Lesley).
276. 352 S.W.3d at 480-81.
277. Id. at 481 (citing Schlittler v. Smith, 101 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. 1937)).
278. 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984). A year after the court decided the case, Professor Ernest
Smith concluded that, "[a] case with the notoriety of Manges should not set the standard for
landowners whose acquisition and use of the executive right involve none of the elements of
overreaching apparently present in that case." Smith, supra note 274, at 406. For a sample of the
many articles discussing Manges, see, e.g., Douglas Martin, Clinton Manges, Volatile Texas Oilman
and
Rancher,
Dies
at
87,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
28,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/business/29manges.html?_r=0; Ken Case, Blind Justice: Is
There Anything Wrong with a Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas Helping Out a Close Friend?,
15 TEx. MONTHLY 136 (1987).
279. Manges, 673 S.W.2d at 183-84 (using the label "fiduciary duty" to refer to the duty of
utmost good faith in the court's discussion of Manges' self-dealing). "Until the Texas Supreme
Court's decision in Manges v. Guerra, the utmost good faith standard had not been considered to
create a fiduciary duty." Mims v. Beall, 810 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tex. App. 1991) (internal citation
omitted). For a thorough discussion and criticism of the court's use of the fiduciary label in Manges,
see Smith, supra note 274, at 406 (noting that Texas cases and most jurisdictions hold executives to
the lower standard of care, utmost good faith, rather than a fiduciary standard).
280. See Smith, supra note 274, at 372-73 (noting that fiduciary duties are on the high end of
the standard of behavior scale). For a recent opinion thoroughly reviewing Texas case law and the
issues raised by a court's use of the fiduciary label, see generally Bradshaw v. Steadfast Fin. LLC,
395 S.W.3d 348 (Tex. App. 2013), reh'ggranted.
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subordinate their interests to the non-executives, a requirement
commentators criticized as "onerous" and as a "deviation" from the
utmost good faith standard previously adopted by Texas courts and
courts of other jurisdictions.2 8 1
B. In re Bass (Tex. 2003): No Duty to Lease, But No "Self-Dealing"
When Leasing
In a 2003 opinion, In re Bass, the court appeared to clarify that the
duty established in Manges was not as "onerous" as the fiduciary label
implied.282 Bass reached the court through a discovery dispute.2 83
Specifically, the non-executives, owners of a two percent nonparticipating royalty interest in a 22,000 acre ranch, sought to review
seismic information obtained by Bass, the owner of the surface and
minerals (the executive).28 4 The court first determined that the
information was a trade secret and not discoverable, unless the nonparticipating royalty interest owners could prove that discovery was
necessary for a fair adjudication of their claim.285 The court decided no
necessity existed because the executive owed no duty to the nonexecutives until a lease was executed.286
In asserting their right to review the seismic information, the nonexecutives had relied on Manges.m However, in Bass the court adopted
a restrictive and fact-specific view of that 1984 case:
Manges purchased one-half of the mineral estate and executive leasing
rights from the Guerra family with the Guerras retaining the other 50%
ownership interest in the mineral estate. The Guerras sued Manges for
self-dealing in leasing a portion of the estate to himself at unfair terms.
We stated that '[a] fiduciary duty arises from the relationship of the
parties ... [t]hat duty requires the holder of the executive right, Manges
281. Smith, supra note 274, at 406 (describing the fiduciary standard for executives as
"onerous" and as a "deviation" from prior law); see also Martin, supra note 273, at 396 ("Most
writers have found that the nature of the oil and gas business does not warrant a fiduciary standard
because the parties themselves do not suppose themselves to be establishing a fiduciary
relationship.").
282. 113 S.W.3d 735, 745 (Tex. 2003).
283. Id at 737 (noting that the issues in the case involve whether seismic data was protected
from disclosure as trade secrets).
284. Id at 738.
285. Id. at 742-43.
286. Id at 743.
287. Id at 744 (stating that the McGills relied on the Manges proposition that a mineral estate
owner has a duty to develop the mineral estate).
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in this case, to acquire for the non-executive every benefit that he
exacts for himself. Accordingly, we held that Manges breached his
fiduciary duty to the Guerras by making a lease to himself under
numerous unfair terms. ... Because Manges held that the executive
owes the non-executive a fiduciary duty, the [non-executives] correctly
state that Bass owes them a duty to acquire every benefit for [them] that
Bass would acquire for himself. What differentiates this case from
Manges, however, is that no evidence of self-dealing exists here. Bass
has not leased his land to himself or argpne else. . .. Thus, the present
facts are distinguishable from Manges.

Following In re Bass, commentators concluded that an executive
owed no affirmative duty to lease, but when executing a lease, the
executive must avoid self-dealing. 289 Instances of self-dealing include
leasing arrangements by executives designed to prevent non-executives
from sharing in higher bonuses and royalty rates. 290 Courts also relied on
In re Bass in concluding that executives did not owe an affirmative duty
to lease and that the duty was not triggered until a lease had been
executed.2 91 One of those cases was Lesley v. Veterans LandBoard.29 2
C Lesley v. Veterans Land Board (Tex. 2011)
1. Facts
In 1998 Bluegreen ("the developer"), bought for two million dollars
about 4,100 acres of land in North Texas that the Lesleys and others
288.

Id. at 744-45 (citations omitted).

289.

1 ERNEST E. SMrH &JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAsLAW OF OIL AND GAS

§ 2.6(C)(4),

at

2-94 to -95 (2d ed. 2013) (noting that decisions subsequent to Manges had "refused to impose this
level of diligence on the executive" and describing In re Bass as implying that the executive "is
barred from obtaining a benefit for himself that is not shared with the nonexecutives" and that "there
is no independent duty to lease, even though failure to do so may deprive the nonexecutives of any
financial benefit from their interest"); Beatty and Ehrman, supra note 272, at 26 (noting that before
the Texas Supreme Court revisited In re Bass in Lesley, "[u]nder current Texas law, an executive
does not breach a fiduciary duty to the non-executive if the executive does not exercise his right to
execute an oil and gas lease").
290. See, e.g., Luecke v. Wallace, 951 S.W.2d 267, 274-75 (Tex. App. 1997) (finding a breach
of duty when executive leased to solely-owned company for 1/8 royalty and $50 an acre bonus and
then assigned lease to original offeror for 1/5 royalty and $150 an acre bonus).
291. See, e.g., Aurora Petroleum, Inc. v. Newton, 287 SW.3d 373, 376-77 (Tex. App. 2009)
("[T]here is no existing oil and gas lease. Therefore, there can be no implied duty to develop . . . .");
Hlavinka v. Hancock, 116 S.W.3d 412, 420 (Tex. App. 2003) ("[T]he executive did not breach a
fiduciary duty to the non-executives without having exercised his executive power."). In Lesley, the
Texas Supreme Court disapproves of both of these opinions. Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex.,
352 S.W.3d 479, 491 n.78 (Tex. 2011).
292. 352 S.W.3d 479 (Tex. 2011).
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(collectively, "the Lesleys") had conveyed to the developer's
predecessor.293 The Lesleys' deed reserved a fraction of the minerals
they already owned but conveyed all of the surface, remaining minerals,
and "the 'full, complete and sole right to execute oil, gas and minerals
leases"' to the developer.294 After the conveyances, the Lesleys became
non-executives who owned fractional non-participating royalty interests.
The developer owned the surface, the remaining fractional mineral
interests in the property, and all of the executive rights. The developer
developed the property into a residential subdivision, Mountain Lakes,
imposed deed restrictions, and sold 1700 lots to various buyers, including
the Veterans Land Board.295 In the deed to the buyers, the developer did
not reserve the executive rights or minerals; therefore, the lot owners
obtained a fractional share of minerals, including the corresponding
executive rights in their lots. 2 96
Seven years later, when the Barnett shale was booming, the Lesleys
sued claiming the executives-the developer and the lot owners-had
breached duties owed to them.297 The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Lesleys, which included rulings that the
executives had breached their duties by (1) imposing deed restrictions
that prohibited drilling, and (2) by failing to lease.298

293. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex. v. Lesley, 281 S.W.3d 602, 609 (Tex. App. 2009).
294. Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 481.
295. Id. at 481-82. The Veterans Land Board (VLB) asserted that sovereign immunity barred
the non-executives' lawsuit against it; both the court of appeals and the Texas Supreme Court agreed
with the VLB. Id at 484.
296. The appellate court and the Texas Supreme Court opinions each relied on Day v. Texland
Petroleum, 786 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990), in deciding that the developer had not reserved executive
rights when it sold each lot. Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 486-87; Lesley, 281 S.W.3d at 616. The trial
court, however, had ruled that the executive rights remained with the developer. Lesley, 281 S.W.3d
at 612. The appellate and supreme court opinions also agreed that the right to develop was conveyed
with the executive right, rejecting the non-executives' claim that they maintained the right to
develop. Id. at 620; Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 486-87. For an argument that the right to develop should
be viewed as separate from the executive right see Kulander, supra note 272, at 576-77.
297. Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 482 ("While Mountain Lakes was being developed, so was the
Barnett Shale, a hydrocarbon-producing geological formation underlying this part of North Texas
and possibly this subdivision."); see also Andarko Petroleum Corp. v. BNW Prop. Co., 393 S.W.3d
846, 850-51 (Tex. App. 2012) (noting that discovery of Barnett shale prompted the non-executives
to sue executives in Lesley).
298. Lesley, 281 S.W.3d at 612.
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Court of Appeals

The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court's rulings regarding
the duty owed by the executives. 2 99 Relying on In re Bass and its
interpretation of Manges, the court held the executives' duties had not
been triggered since they had not leased the minerals.300 Overall, the
court found that the developer had acted properly by executing deeds of
trust covering the surface and by imposing deed restrictions that
prohibited drilling. 0 ' In rejecting the Lesleys' analogies to Manges, the
court stated that "the facts in this case are nothing like the facts in
Manges."302 Instead, the court focused on the parties' original bargain
when the developer bought the property and all of the executive rights in
1998:
This case involves an arms-length transaction between the Lesley
Appellees and [the developer]. [The developer] wanted to obtain
property for the purpose of developing a residential subdivision ....
The Lesley Appellees certainly knew that a residential developer would
not want drilling or other similar activities to take place on the surface
area in the subdivision. With that knowledge, the Lesley Appellees
sold the property to [the developer] for about $2,000,000. The Lesley
Appellees could have negotiated to retain the executive rights ....
Instead, the Lesley Appellees willingly conveyed the executive
rights ... . Based on the facts in this case ... te executives] did not
breach a fiduciary duty to [the non-executives].
Although the appellate court continued to use the fiduciary label, it
adopted the restrictive view of that term reflected in In re Bass. In
Lesley, the Texas Supreme Court, however, rejected not only the
299. Id at 618-19. The court agreed that the developer had conveyed executive rights to the lot
owners. Id at 617.
300. Id at 619.
301. Id The non-executives had tried to equate the deeds of trust executed by the developer to
those executed in Manges, but the court disagreed: "In Manges, the executive's deed of trust covered
all mineral interests, including the executive right. . . . However, the deeds of trust that [the
developer] executed did not purport to cover any mineral interests." Id. Moreover, the court held
that executing deeds of trust and imposing deed restrictions, even if construed as an exercise of the
executive right, did not breach the duty owed to the non-executives. Id at 620.
302. Id at 619.
303. Id at 619-20. In stressing that the non-executives should not have sold the executive
rights, the court noted, "had the Lesley Appellees retained the executive rights . . . the restriction
against mineral development would not prohibit them from exercising the rights." Id at 629 n.12
(citing Prop. Owners of Leisure Land, Inc. v. Woolf& Magee, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Tex. App.
1990) ("The mineral owner, having the dominant estate, cannot be limited by subdivision restrictions
imposed by surface owners after the estate is severed.").
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appellate court's rulings, but also its view of In re Bass and Manges.
3.

Texas Supreme Court Opinion

Before addressing the legal questions, the court acknowledged shaleera economics:
While Mountain Lakes was being developed, so was the Barnett
Shale .... Almost all the surrounding area came under lease for oil
and gas production. There is evidence that Mountain Lakes is sitting
on $610 million worth of milgals that, in large part, cannot be reached
from outside the subdivision.
The court's opinion contains no citation following this sentence, and
the executives argued the evidence did not support that claim. 3 05
Moreover, the executives noted they had not turned down offers to lease
because they had not received any offers.306 Nonetheless, the court
reversed the court of appeals and found the executives had breached their
duties in Lesley.
a.

A Retreat from In re Bass: The Duty Arises Prior to Leasing and
May Require Leasing

As noted above, the court of appeals in Lesley had relied on In re
Bass in ruling that the executive duty had not been triggered because no
304. Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 352 S.W.3d 479, 482 (Tex. 2011). For another recent
Texas Supreme Court opinion expressing pro-development sentiments in its analysis see CoastalOil
& Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 15-17 (Tex. 2008) (finding the rule of capture
prevented recovery for trespass based on allegations that hydraulic fracturing crossed lease lines).
"The experts in this case agree on two important things. One is that hydraulic fracturing is not
optional; it is essential to the recovery of oil and gas in many areas . . .. (This fact has recently been
brought to the public's attention because of development in the Barnett shale in north Texas, which
is entirely dependent on hydraulic fracturing.)." Id. at 16.
305. Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 482; see also Respondent Bluegreen Southwest One, L.P.'s Motion
for Rehearing at I n.1, Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 352 S.W.3d 479 (Tex. 2011) (No. 090306), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/ebriefs/09/09030618.pdf ("The evidence
regarding the value of the mineral estate consists of one affidavit supplied by [non-executives] in a
motion for summary judgment, provided at a time when gas prices were high and speculation
regarding the Barnett shale production was high. The Affidavit that is in the record does not take
into account whether or not the Barnett shale formation is constant throughout the Property and is a
'best guess' at value and overstates the value. None of the [executives] ever received an offer to
lease the Property for any amount of money.").
306. Motion for Rehearing, supra note 305, at 1 n.1; see also Oral Argument at 28:18, Lesley v.
Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 352 S.W.3d 479 (Tex. 2011) (No. 09-0306), 2010 WL 3713693.
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The Texas Supreme Court, however,
leases had been executed.
emphasized the unique facts of that earlier opinion and then concluded it
cannot "be read to shield the executive from liability for all inaction."307
However, although the court disapproved of decisions that had held there
was no affirmative duty to lease, it stopped short of imposing such a
requirement. Instead, the court held:
It may be that an executive cannot be liable to the non-executive for
failing to lease minerals when never requested to do so, but an
executive's refusal to lease must be examined more carefully. If the
refusal is arbitrary or motivated by self-interest to ti4 8 non-executive's
detriment, the executive may have breached his duty.
b. Anti-Drilling Restrictions Cancelled as Remedy for Breach of
Executive Duty
While the Texas Supreme Court recognized that the developer had
"acquired the executive right for the specific purpose of protecting the
subdivision," it struck the deed restrictions it had imposed. 30 9 Relying on
Manges, the court found the developer had breached its duty, which it
still referred to as fiduciary, by imposing the deed restrictions. 3 to The
court concluded "the common law provides appropriate protection to the
surface owner through the accommodation doctrine." 3 11 That courtcreated doctrine provides some protection to pre-existing surface uses
against mineral estate dominance in Texas, one of the few majorproducing states without a surface-protection statute.3 12 Whether that
307. Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 491 ("While there was an allegation of self-interest in Bass, we
concluded that it was not sufficiently supported by the record to warrant compelling discovery of
privileged information.").
308. Id. (disapproving of Aurora Petroleum, Inc. v. Newton, 287 S.W.3d 373 (Tex. App. 2009)
and Hlavinka v. Hancock, 116 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. App. 2003)).
309. Id. at 491-92.
310. Id. at 491 ("Following Manges, [the court held] that [the developer] breached its duty. . .
by filing the restrictive covenants.").
311. Id.at492.
312. See generally ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL & GAS
§ 2.1.B(2)(b) (2012) ("An unreasonable or excessive use of the surface will give the surface owner
an action in damages or a right to an injunction."). The Texas case that established the
accommodation doctrine is Getty Oil v. Jones. 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971) ("[W]here there is
an existing use by the surface owner which would otherwise be precluded or impaired, and where
under the established practices in the industry there are alternatives available to the [mineral-estate
owner] whereby the minerals can be recovered, the rules of reasonable usage of the surface may
require the adoption of an alternative by the lessee."); see also Bumey, A Pragmatic Approach,
supra note 14, at 63 (discussing the Getty Oil approach and its consequences). For a recent article
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doctrine will become necessary or prove useful for lot owners in the
Mountain Lakes subdivision remains to be seen.313
D. Implications ofLesley's Retroactive Ruling in the Shale Era
1. Acquiring the Executive Right for Surface Protection: A Futile
Proposition
In its motion for rehearing, the developer urged the court to limit the
ruling prospectively in light of public reliance on prior law, citing Moser
3 14
In that case, the court overruled
v. United States Steel Corporation.
the "surface destruction test" for interpreting the phrase "other minerals"
in deeds, but restricted the ruling to deeds executed after the date of the
opinion in light of public reliance on previous holdings and "an inability
to foresee a coming change in the law."3 15 The developer in Lesley noted
that prior to the decision, acquiring the executive right as a surfaceprotection measure had been literally text book law on which it had been
entitled to rely:
It is also possible that the severance of the executive right has nothing
to do with a desire to facilitate mineral development. A purchaser who
is primarily interested in surface use may insist upon iguiring the
exclusive executive right to protect his surface investment.
The court, however, rejected the developer's plea and overruled the
motion for rehearing. Therefore, because the court determined that
surface owners could rely on the accommodation doctrine but not its
deed restrictions, the developer's purchase of the executive right in 1998
arguing that Pennsylvania and other Marcellus shale states should adopt the accommodation
doctrine, see Paige Anderson, Note, Reasonable Accommodation: Split Estates, Conservation
Easements, and Drilling in the MarcellusShale, 31 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 136, 140-41 (2013) (noting that
in light of limited and ineffective legislation protecting surface rights, courts should adopt Texas's
version of the accommodation doctrine as set forth in Getty Oil).
313. The Texas Supreme Court remanded the Lesley case for proceedings consistent with its
rulings. According to conversations with lawyers involved, the case has settled.
314. Motion for Rehearing, supra note 305, at 5 (citing Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d
99 (Tex. 1984)).
315. Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 103. In another article I criticized the court's opinion for the
prospective ruling in Moser, arguing the public had not relied on cases establishing the "surface
destruction test" since it required fact-finding and had changed over time. Burney, Who's On First,
supra note 238, at 712-15.
316.

LoWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 602 (6th ed. 2008) (cited in

Motion for Rehearing Veterans LandBd. ofTex., supranote 305, at 3).
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proved ineffective for protecting its surface investment. Since the
opinion has retroactive effect, other surface owners in Texas, including
ranchers and farmers and other developers, may find that their efforts to
ensure surface protection-through deeds and wills that consolidated the
executive right in one owner-were futile.
2. Changing Bargains, Expanding Duties and Case-by-Case Results
By striking the deed restrictions, the executives in Lesley argued the
court had ignored their previous bargains, an approach at odds with other
Texas Supreme Court opinions.3 " Specifically, in disputes involving
other oil patch transactions, particularly the oil and gas lease, the Texas
Supreme Court has declined to rewrite parties' bargains "to achieve what
it believes to be a fair contract or to remedy an unwise or improvident
contract."3 18 Following this approach, the court of appeals in Lesley had
concluded that the non-executives should be bound by their previous
decision to sell their executive rights to a real estate developer.319
Endorsing this view in an article written a year after Manges that
criticized its use of the fiduciary label, Professor Ernest Smith opined as
follows:
For example, in the context of an ordinary land sale, . . . where the

grantee insists on the exclusive executive nght in order to protect his
surface estate, it seems highly unlikely that the parties expect the
executive to act as a fiduciary.... A grantee whose principal concern
is surface use will pay a premium for the exclusive executive right. If
the grantor, who has retained a nonparticipating share of the mineral
estate, can later insist that the executive power be used for his principal
benefit, the intent 9 the transaction has been defeated and the grantor
unjustly enriched.'
Yet in Lesley, rather than determine that the grantors-non-executives
had been unjustly enriched, the court found the grantee-executive had
317. Motion for Rehearing, supranote 305, at 3 (citing Moser, 676 S.W.2d 99).
318. See id. at 6 n.2; Bumey, The Texas Supreme Court and Oil, supra note 273, at 259 (noting
the court's refusal to rewrite the oil and gas lease to benefit lessors by implying covenants); see also
Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powell, 154 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. 1941) (emphasizing that "the court
should not read into the [lease] additional provisions unless this be necessary"). See, e.g., HECI
Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 889 (Tex. 1998).
319. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex. v. Lesley, 281 S.W.3d 602, 625 (Tex. App. 2009) (stating that
the non-executives should have understood the terms of the deed, and reversing the trial courts'
summary judgment entry to reform the deeds).
320. Smith, supranote 274, at 373-74.
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breached its duty.32 1 Additionally, the court expanded executives' duties
by finding they exist prior to leasing and "may" include a duty to
lease.322 Instead of providing general rules, the court expressly declined
to do so because of "the widely differing circumstances."323 This caseby-case approach, which continues to include the fiduciary standard,
ensures that non-executives will file lawsuits claiming executives have
breached an enlarged and unpredictable list of duties.32 4 For drafting
future arrangements, in light of Lesley, parties should assess the burdens
associated with executive rights before severing and acquiring them in
the shale era.325

321. While the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Lesley notes that the developer had acquired
the executive right to protect the subdivision from intrusive development, it does not examine the
language in the 1998 deed that conveyed to the executive the "full, complete and sole right to
execute oil, gas and minerals leases." Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 352 S.W.3d 479, 481-82
(Tex. 2011).
322. Id. at 483.
323. Id. at491.
324. Recent cases reflect this fact. See, e.g., Friddle v. Fisher, 378 S.W.3d 475, 478 (Tex. App.
2012) (remanding the case back to the trial court for factual findings regarding duty owed by the
executive to the non-participating royalty interest owners when the executive failed to distribute
bonus payment); Bradshaw v. Steadfast Fin., L.L.C., 395 S.W.3d 348, 370 (detailing the duties owed
by the executive right holder to non-participating royalty interests). For the view that the court
exercised "judicial foresight" in Lesley, see Christopher S. Kulander, The Executive Right to Lease
Mineral Real Property in Texas Before and After Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 44 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 529, 571 (2013) (applauding court's "foresight" in adopting a case-by-case approach
but noting litigation will increase).
325. Not all shale-era states will follow Lesley's lead. Louisiana has codified the executive duty
and confined it to leasing transactions: "The owner of an executive interest is not obligated to grant a
mineral lease, but in doing so, he must act in good faith and in the same manner as a reasonably
prudent landowner or mineral servitude owner whose interest is not burdened by a nonexecutive
interest." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:109 (1989). Given the Texas Supreme Court's prodevelopment approach and its treatment of the parties' previous bargain in Lesley, one wonders
whether any document prohibiting leasing would be effective in Texas for lands burdened by nonexecutive interests. Instead, developers may have to decline to purchase the property or attempt to
buy all of the minerals, an expensive proposition. Other executives, such as parties buying or
inheriting mineral interests burdened by pre-existing non-participating royalty interests, face the
frustrating position of owing "fiduciary" duties to parties with whom they have had no interaction.
See, e.g., Andretta v. West, 415 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Tex. 1967) (imposing a fiduciary relationship
between the successors in interest); Friddle, 378 S.W.3d at 482 (finding a fiduciary relationship
although there was little to no interaction between the parties).
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VI. DEED REFORMATION V. INTERPRETATION: ANOTHER LESSON FROM
LESLEY

In addition to reversing the appellate court's rulings regarding the
executive duty in Lesley, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the court's
ruling declining to reform the 1998 deed. According to the grantors, the
Lesleys, the parties intended to reserve a 1/4 mineral interest, not 1/8 as
expressed in the deed.326 Because the language was clear, the grantors
did not ask the court to interpret the deed 32 7-the process involved in
resolving the perennial title issues discussed above.328 Instead, the
Lesleys sought to have the deed reformed to correct the mistake. 329 This
section discusses the differences between interpretation and reformation
claims, and suggests that courts should strictly apply or reject the
discovery rule in reformation suits in order to preserve the stability of
land titles in the shale era.
A. Statutes ofLimitations:Applicable to Reformation But Irrelevant to
Interpretation
In interpretation disputes, parties seek legal clarification or
declaration about the meaning of words in documents. In reaching
determinations, courts follow the rules of document interpretation
discussed above, which aid in ascertaining the parties' intent.33 o
However, if a document contains a mistake, meaning one party claims it
does not reflect the parties' intent, the proper cause of action is
reformation.3 Unlike claims seeking interpretation, reformation causes
of action are subject to statutes of limitations designed to bar stale
claims.332 A reformation claim becomes stale when too much time has
326. The deed provided that the Lesleys reserved "one-fourth (1/4) of the oil, gas, sulphur and
other minerals to which Grantors are now entitled to in all of the lands covered by this conveyance."
Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 484. The Lesleys owned a 1/2 mineral interest, meaning they reserved 1/4 of
that 1/2, or a 1/8 mineral interest. Id. at 485.
327. Id. at 485 n.24 ("Lesley does not contend for a favorable construction of the reservation
according to its terms, taking into account the inconsistency she asserts.").
328. See generally supra Part I.B.
329. Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 485.
330. See supraPart II.B.
331. ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 3.10 (2009).
332. See, e.g., Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 485-86; Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939, 943-44 (Tex.
1980).
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passed, allowing memories and evidence about the mistake to fade, the
classic reason justifying statutes of limitations in general."' Such
evidence is irrelevant in document interpretation claims, which involve
competing views about the meaning of words, not allegations that words
were mistakenly included or omitted.334
B. The Discovery Rule and Reformation: When Should Partiesto a
Deed Know About a Mistake?

In Lesley, the alleged mistake occurred when the reservation in the
deed referred to 1/4 of what the grantors owned; because grantors owned
1/2, and the deed reserved a 1/8 mineral interest. 335 According to the
grantors, the reservation should have stated that they had reserved 1/4.336
To correct that mistake, they sought to have the deed reformed. The trial
court granted this request but the court of appeals ruled it was barred by
the applicable statute of limitations.337
As the court of appeals explained, a reformation cause of action
involves two elements: "(1) an original agreement and (2) a mutual
mistake, made after the original agreement, in reducing the original
agreement to writing." 3 In Texas, a four-year statute of limitations
applies, but the discovery rule may toll that time period "until the party
seeking reformation knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence,
should have known of the mistake in the deed." 39 Because the deed was
executed in 1998, and the reformation claim was not filed until 2006, the
statute of limitations would bar the Lesleys' claim, unless the discovery
rule applied.340
333. As Justice Holmes explained, statutes of limitations serve the important purpose of
"preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." Order of R.R. Telegraphers
v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944); see also Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai,
Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. 1996) (allowing the discovery rule to toll a statute of limitations but
only where the injury is "inherently undiscoverable").
334. See Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth, supra note 12, at 78 (explaining that when trying to
ascertain the intent of the parties, it "is not the intent that the parties meant but failed to express, but
the intention that is expressed").
335. Lesley, 352 S.W. 3d at 485.
336. Id
337. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex. v. Lesley, 281 S.W.3d 602, 625 (Tex. App. 2009).
338. Id. at 623 (citing Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 741 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex. 1987)).
339. Id at 624 (citing Brown v. Havard, 593 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex. 1980)).
340. Id
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1. Lesley Court of Appeals: No Discovery Rule-Parties Charged With
Knowledge When Deed Was Executed
The court of appeals in Lesley ruled that the discovery rule did not
toll the four-year statute of limitations.3 4' In reaching that conclusion,
the court noted the Lesleys "knew that they owned a one-half mineral
interest before their conveyances to [the developer]. By reading the clear
language . .. they would have known that they were reserving one-fourth
of their one-half mineral interest." 342 Relying on a 1980 Texas Supreme
Court decision, Brown v. Havard, the appellate court concluded that if
there were mistakes, they "were 'so plainly evident as to3 43 charge [the
Lesley Appellees] with the legal effect of the words used."'
2. Lesley Texas Supreme Court: Discovery Rule Preserved Reformation
Claim
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals and
held the discovery rule applied. 3 " In reaching its conclusion, the court
focused on other language in the 1998 deed that reserved to the grantors
1/4 of all bonuses and delay rentals, which the court noted is "twice the
amount to which a one-eighth mineral interest would be entitled."3 45 The
court also pointed to subsequent conduct by the developer: the developer
had described the reservation in the minerals as 1/4 rather than 1/8 in its
own deeds to lot owners.346 Like the court of appeals, the supreme court
3 47
relied on Brown v. Havard.
That case involved a deed containing the

341. Id. at 625.
342. Id.
343. Id. (citing Brown, 593 S.W.2d at 944).
344. Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd. of Tex., 352 S.W.3d 479, 486 (Tex. 2011) (noting that the
statute of limitations question involves disputed facts instead of flat-out determining that the statute
of limitations barred reformation).
345. Id. The deed had reserved 1/4 of the 1/2 of the minerals the grantors owned, which equals
1/8, but continued to state that the grantors reserved 1/4 of bonus and delay rentals. Id.
346. Id. In its motion for rehearing, the developer argued that the court's reliance on subsequent
conduct contradicted prior cases and destabilized land titles: "Now title examiners must review
documents after the date the deed was executed to determine how later parties may have interpreted
even unambiguous deeds, because that subsequent interpretation (even if wrong) can allow an earlier
grantor or grantee to use the discovery rule to rewrite the deed." Motion for Rehearing, supra note
305, at 12.
347. See Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 485.
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double and restated fraction issues discussed above. 34 8 In Lesley, the
Texas Supreme Court admitted that the mistake in the 1998 deed was not
"as opaque as the one in Brown," but decided the discovery rule raised
disputed fact issues affecting the reformation claim, and remanded it to
the trial court.349
3.

An Argument in Support of a Restrictive Approach to the Discovery
Rule for Reformation Claims: Title Stability in the Shale Era

The Texas Supreme Court's approach to the discovery rule in Lesley
conflicts with the restrictive approach to the discovery rule it has adopted
for other oil patch causes of action. In particular, Texas opinions have
declined to apply the discovery rule to causes of action that lessors assert
against their lessees.3 50 Instead, the court has charged lessors with the
burden to obtain knowledge about their lessees' activities from a variety
of sources, including public records for oil and gas documents.35 1 If
348. Id. at 485-86. The Browns had deed property reserving "an undivided one-half nonparticipating royalty (Being equal to, not less than an undivided 1/16th) of all the oil, gas and other
minerals. . . ." Brown, 593 S.W.2d at 940 (emphasis omitted). Thirteen years later, the successor to
the grantee, Havard, sued seeking interpretation in his favor or reformation. Id. at 941. The Texas
Supreme Court held the discovery rule applied and a factual issue existed about when the grantee
should have known about the mistake. Id. at 944. The dissent in Brown argued that reformation of
the deed was barred by limitations and Havard was not entitled to reformation since he was on notice
of what his deed contained. Id at 948 (McGee, J., dissenting).
349. Lesley, 352 S.W.3d at 485-86.
350. See, e.g., HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Tex. 1998) (noting that
courts have tolled the statute of limitations where information was fraudulently concealed from a
lessee).
351. See, e.g., id.; Shell Oil Co. v. Ross, 356 S.W.3d 924, 928 (Tex. 2011) ("Reasonable
diligence requires that owners of property interests make themselves aware of relevant information
[regarding royalties] available in the public record."); Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 58
S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2001) (noting that there are sources available from which royalty owners
may obtain information about royalty calculations from their lessees); see also Samson Lone Star,
Ltd. v. Hooks, 389 S.W.3d 409, 441-42 (Tex. App. 2012) (criticizing the supreme court's approach
to the discovery rule as applied to lessors). Justice Jim Sharp provided:
I reluctantly concur, based on the Texas Supreme Court's holding in BP America
Production Co. v. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59 (Tex.201 1). In that case, the Texas Supreme
Court makes clear that no lies on the part of a lessee, however self-serving and egregious,
are sufficient to toll limitations, as long as it is technically possible for the lessor to have
discovered the lie by resort to the Railroad Commission records. This burden the Court
imposes upon lessors is severe. It is now a lessor's duty to presume that any statement
made by its lessee is false and to ransack the esoteric and oft-changing records at the
Railroad Commission to discover the truth or falsity of its lessee's statements. If, as is
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lessors must take these affirmative steps to preserve causes of action
under their oil and gas leases, courts should require grantors or grantees
claiming reformation to read their deeds within the statutory time period

after delivery. 3 52
Shale era production may motivate grantors and grantees to review
their deeds for mistakes as required for reformation claims. 5 A liberal
approach to the discovery rule potentially preserves and encourages these
claims by allowing parties to ignore mistakes for years after deeds were
executed. The court of appeals' approach in Lesley charges parties with
knowledge they would have obtained had they read their deeds on the
date of execution. That approach reflects general views charging parties
with knowledge about documents they sign.354 It also promotes title
stability by preventing potential changes in ownership years after title
examiners have based decisions on plain terms in the four-corners of
deeds. To promote title stability, courts should strictly apply statutes of
often the case, these records are technical in nature and require expert review to ferret out
the truth, it is the lessor's job to hire experts out of its own pocket to perform such a
review. If a lessor fails to take these steps, then it will have failed in exercising
reasonable diligence to protect its mineral interests and, if the lessee's fraud is successful
for longer than the limitations period, the lessor's claims will be barred by limitations.
Id.
352. This should at least be the case when the basis for reformation is mistake, rather than fraud
or misrepresentation, which provide other grounds for challenging a deed. Moreover, even if the
statute of limitations does not bar the claim, or was not raised as a defense, parties must still meet
their burden of proof. See Arndt v. Maki, 813 N.W.2d 564, 572 (N.D. 2012) (affirming trial court
ruling that evidence was insufficient to support reformation of 1984 deed that did not contain a
mineral reservation); Van Berkom v. Cordonnier, 807 N.W.2d 802, 806 (N.D. 2011) (affirming trial
court ruling that evidence was insufficient to prove mineral reservation was mistakenly omitted from
a 1995 warranty deed).
353. For a recent case see Dupnik v. Hermis, involving land in the Eagle Ford shale in south
Texas. No. 04-12-00417-CV, 2013 WL 979199 (Tex. App. Mar. 13, 2013). The issue in that case
was whether a deed had reserved the minerals or conveyed the surface and the minerals to a
described tract. Id. at *1. The deed described the land, but in the reservation section the word
"none" appeared. Id. An exhibit, however, noted the property conveyed was "surface only." Id.
Although the case confusingly focuses on whether the deed was void or voidable, and does not
mention reformation, it rejects application of the discovery rule, finding the parties should have read
their deed when it was executed. Id. at *2-4.
354.

ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS

§ 3.10,

at

3-79 (2009) ("The most common defense to a suit for reformation is the statute of limitations ... but
there is often a dispute over when the statute began to run. Of course the statute of limitations
presumptively begins running immediately on the deed's execution and delivery. Because the
parties to the deed are charged with knowledge of its contents, this presumption is virtually
irrebutable if the deed clearly and obviously deviates from the parties' agreement").
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limitations and limit the discovery rule for deed reformation claims in the
shale era.
VII. CONCLUSION
Along with oil and gas production, the shale-play booms guarantee a
surge of oil and gas title disputes involving the perennial issues discussed
above. States with long histories of production and case law have
grappled with several of these issues, providing answers for some and
confusion regarding others. In particular, executive-right owners may
find that the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Lesley has burdened
them with duties for which they had not bargained, and that owning that
right provides no value as a surface-protection measure. However, title
examiners can take comfort in other Texas decisions that appear to have
finally rejected the two-grant doctrine for interpreting conflicting
fractions in multiclause deed forms. Yet that state has not fully clarified
how title examiners and courts should interpret deeds with double or
restated fractions, which invariably are multiples of the usual 1/8
landowner's royalty. As I argue, while that lease royalty is now more
historic than usual, courts should incorporate an understanding of the
legacy of that 1/8 royalty into the interpretation process. That approach
ensures results more consistent with the over-arching goal of deed
interpretation: ascertaining the parties' intent. In addition to that
interpretative goal, however, courts should adopt rules that promote
another goal: title stability. For example, the Texas approach to the
mineral or royalty issue promotes that goal by according set meaning to
the royalty and mineral labels, one that does not vary with outside
evidence. On the contrary, the Oklahoma approach allows the meaning
of those words to vary depending upon whether a lease pre-dated the
deed. That approach complicates titles by requiring title examiners to
review outside evidence and determine ownership on a case-by-case
basis.
Instead, in the shale era courts, should embrace the goal of ensuring
title stability by rejecting rules that require scrutiny of extraneous
evidence and that motivate strained interpretations. For example, Kansas
courts stretched for a mineral interpretation to avoid the application of
the rule against perpetuities to non-participating royalty interests.
Kansas courts should complete the process started in Rucker and declare
that non-participating royalty interests--common oil-patch interests-are
vested interests immune from the common law rule against perpetuities.
Regarding the meaning of "minerals," Pennsylvania acknowledged the
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extent of public reliance on the Dunham rule and reaffirmed it for
Marcellus shale disputes in that state. However, the rule retains rule of
construction traits, which permits consideration of outside evidence
regarding the parties' intent. Fortunately, the courts' restrictive approach
to the rule in practice, which confines interpretation disputes to the deed,
should promote title stability. Another lesson from Lesley regarding title
stability is the value of a strict approach to the discovery rule in deed
reformation actions, one that requires grantors and grantees to discover
mistakes in their deeds within a state's set statute of limitations period.
In addition to providing guidance to courts, Lesley and other cases
discussed in this article provide valuable drafting lessons about perennial
issues in oil, gas and mineral deeds. More lessons will follow as courts
address the inevitable boom in title litigation spawned by the shale
revolution.
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